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ACCESS TO UNITED STATES COURTS
BY PURCHASERS OF FOREIGN LISTED
SECURITIES IN THE AFTERMATH OF
MORRISON v. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA
BANK LTD.
Roger W Kirby*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States published its
opinion in the case Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.' In Morrison,
defendant National Australia Bank ("NAB") was an Australian entity with its
shares principally traded in Australia that also had American Depository
Receipts ("ADRs") listed on the New York Stock Exchange.? In 1998, NAB
acquired an American entity headquartered in Florida. In 2001, NAB began
a series of write-downs attributable to the subsidiary's false accounting. The
* Roger W. Kirby is managing partner of the American law firm, Kirby McInerney LLP, having
offices principally in New York, and Texas, and during 2010-2011 a visiting Law Fellow at St. Hilda's
College, University of Oxford. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by Rebecca Song.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
2. ADRs represent the right to receive a specified number of shares of the issuer's common stock.
Their listing on domestic exchanges represents consensual submission to domestic regulation. There
are various levels of ADRs or ADSs, distinguished by a correspondence between disclosure obligations
and distribution rights. The lowest level-Level 1-may be traded only OTC, but must have its shares
traded at least one foreign exchange and, tellingly for purpose of predicting dissemination into the
United States, publish its annual report in English on its website. Level 2 and above require filings with
the SEC on Form 20-F, comparable to Form 10-K and allow for trading on the broader exchanges, such
as the NYSE. See Foreign Issuer Reporting Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 8959, Exchange
Act Release No. 58,620, International Series Release No. 1310, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,300, at 58,301 (Sept.
23, 2008) (final rule).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act amendments to the Exchange Act, oblige the SEC to create rules that require
an issuer's principal senior officers to certify to the truth of quarterly and annual reports. 15 U.S.C. §
7241 (2002). The Act also imposes criminal penalties for truth-telling failures. The SEC accordingly
passed a rule requiring those officers to certify Exchange Act filings on Form 10-Q, Form 10-K, Form
20-F (except as filed under § 240.13a-19 - shell companies) and Form 40-F (Canadian companies).
Form 20-F generally obliges foreign entities that have registered ADRs and ADSs for trading on
America's principal markets to provide information comparable to what is supplied on Form 10-K by
domestic entities. Wide distribution and trading of shares in United States markets assures the
influence of their price movements on shares of the same issuer traded abroad-efficient markets
assumed-and vice versa.
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subsidiary allegedly had manipulated its books and sent the falsely inflated
numbers to the issuer's Australian headquarters, which then published the
information in press releases and public filings.
The issue addressed and decided by the Supreme Court was "whether §
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to
foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in
connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges."3 The Court held
"section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed
on an American Stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other
security in the United States."4
The stakes associated with the issue are significant. Foreign issuers
"considering entering or remaining in the U.S. capital markets must face the
potential world-wide litigation exposure that a U.S. securities market
presence uniquely threatens."' Vivendi, a French company, requires no
persuasion of the significance of the stakes. On January 29, 2010, a New
York jury returned a verdict against Vivendi that, prior to Morrison, would
have lead to as much as $9.0 billion of damages. 6 Morrison has since
effected a significant reduction of those damages. Prior, three class actions
against foreign issuers including claims of persons who had purchased shares
on foreign exchanges had settled for an aggregate $2.0 billion.7
The stakes are also significant because of the number of instances where
United States residents have acquired securities on foreign exchanges and
who now will find themselves excluded from the protection of § 10(b).'
3. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875.
4. Id at 2888.
5. John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Policeman To the World? The Cost Of Global Class Actions,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18, 2008, at 5, col. l [hereinafter Securities Policeman]; see also John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Two factors present Jbreign issuers with a quandary; Certijyjbreign classes only in two instances, THE
NAT'L L.J., June I I, 2007, at 12, col. 1. Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of
Law and director of the Center on Corporate Governance at the Columbia University Law School.
6. Court Finds Vivendi Liable for Misleading Investors, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at B3,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/business/30vivendi.html.
7. See In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 3:04-cv-00374-JAP-JJH, docket entries 525 &
531 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2008) (order and judgment approving settlement of $89.5 million for US-
purchasers); In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig. I and 11, civil action 01-cv-1855 (RMB), docket
entry 192 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2006) (decision and order approving settlement of $438 million in cash
plus 314 million shares of Nortel common stock for the benefit of members for Nortel I class under
class period Oct. 24, 2000, through Feb. 15, 2001, inclusive) and "Nortell II", 05-md-1659 (LAP),
docket entry 177 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2006) (decision and order approving settlement of $370 million in
cash plus 314,333,875 shares of Nortel common stock for Nortell II class under class period April 24,
2003, through April 27, 2004, inclusive); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 437 F. Supp. 2d
467 (D. Md. 2006) (final judgment approving $1.1-billion settlement). See also infra "Conclusion"
(discussion of Royal Dutch/Shell multi-hundred-million-dollar settlements).
8. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F 2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975) (class action, U.S.
purchasers of foreign issuer's securities listed on foreign exchanges permitted to proceed when U.S.
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This paper does the following. First, it summarizes Morrison. Second,
it offers critique of the majority's opinion in that case, asserting that it
overstates its claims to support in the language of § 10(b) and the Exchange
Act; 9 understates or ignores text that clearly authorizes extraterritorial rights
of action; overstates comity implications of extraterritorial application of §
10(b), and that the Court's professed concerns about comity are drained of
authenticity because, notwithstanding Morrison, agencies of the United
States still may pursue foreign issuers even for criminal violations of § 10(b);
and misstates the Court's obligations to defer to the view of the SEC that §
10(b) does reach beyond domestic bounds, under specified circumstances.
Third and fourth, this paper describes the ways in which, despite
Morrison, foreign investors retain access to American courthouses, even in
connection with securities purchased abroad, and attempt to predict SEC and
legislative responses to the decision. In these sections, we also remark upon
the Court's unprovoked attack upon securities class action litigation, and note
that, if one of the Court's goals was to reduce foreign exposure to American
civil litigation, an unintended consequence of the decision may be to increase
the volume of cases, as single forum, single class actions, may be replaced by
multi-forum, and multi-class actions grounded on diverse state laws. In this
section, we also conduct an abbreviated survey of the laws of several states
with a view to identification of both hurdles and possibilities for securities
fraud claims at the state level. An additional, unintended Morrison
purchasers resided within the U.S. but U.S. purchasers residing outside the U.S. permitted to proceed
only if acts of material importance in the U.S. significantly contributed to their losses); Itoba Ltd. v. Lep
Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1044 (1996) (wholly owned subsidiary
of U.S. corporation who purchased foreign issuer's securities listed on foreign exchange allowed to
proceed); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (class action, U.S. and
Canadian purchasers of French issuer's securities listed on foreign exchanges and of ADRs listed
domestically allowed to proceed); In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (class action, U.S. purchasers of ADSs listed domestically and of foreign issuer's
securities listed on foreign exchange allowed to proceed); In re Rhodia S.A. Sec. Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d
527 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (class action, court retained jurisdiction over foreign and US purchasers of ADSs
listed domestically and over U.S. purchasers of foreign issuer's securities listed on foreign exchanges);
In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (class action, U.S., French, English and
Dutch purchasers of ADRs listed domestically and of foreign issuer's securities listed on foreign
exchanges allowed to proceed); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712
(D.N.J. 2007) (class action, U.S. purchasers of ADRs listed domestically and of securities listed on
foreign exchanges allowed to proceed); In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 1546 WHP, 2004 WL
2190357 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) (class action, U.S. class member purchasers of ADRs listed
domestically and of securities listed on foreign exchanges allowed to proceed); In re Baan Co. Sec.
Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000) (class action, US purchasers of foreign issuer's securities listed
on foreign exchange permitted to proceed); Cf, Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, No. 08 Civ. 3758
(VM), 2010 WL 537593 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2010) (class action, U.S. purchasers of ADRs listed
domestically permitted to proceed, with question of standing to assert claims on behalf of U.S.
purchasers of foreign issuer's securities on foreign exchange left for resolution at class certification
stage).
9. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act'), 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq. (2009).
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consequence may discourage American and foreign investors from the
purchase of securities on foreign exchanges because doing so would mean
relinquishment of the protection of § 10(b). A final consequence of
Morrison, as bizarre as doubtless unintended, is that class plaintiffs properly
in the United States may well agree to release claims of those who purchased
securities on foreign exchanges although the claims themselves could not
have brought in American courts.'0 Whether foreign courts would honor
those releases and accompanying judgments remains highly uncertain."
Last, we discuss post-Morrison decisions. These have, for greater part,
expanded its preclusive effect.
II. THE MORRISON DECISION,
BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY
A. SECURITY MARKETS PRIOR TO MORRISON
Since Big Bang sudden deregulation of financial markets in 1986, the
advent of electronic, screen-based and computer-driven trading and
investment activities,12 the number of issuers whose shares trade on
international exchanges has increased substantially." Foreign issuers elect to
have their securities listed and traded on various American exchanges via
ADRs. As mentioned above and described at note 1, these instruments
represent ownership in shares of a foreign company, with each ADR being
issued by a U.S. depositary bank and corresponding to a fraction of a share, a
single share, or multiple shares of the foreign stock. ADR listings are not
forced upon a foreign issuer. To list securities via ADRs, issuers must
undertake to satisfy specific SEC filing requirements.14 ADRs, thus, almost
always trade on American exchanges because a foreign issuer elects to have
them do so, and in a manner compliant with filing requirements established
by the SEC. Individual shares represented by an ADR are sometimes called
ADSs.' 5
The presence of foreign securities on domestic exchanges has increased
substantially over the years. As Professor Coffee describes:
10. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 380 (1996).
11. See Vivendi, 242 F.R.D. at 96-106 (discussion of how different nations may respond to United
States judgment in an opt-out class action).
12. See Nicholas Goodison, The Big Bang: Taking on the world, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 26,
1986.
13. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUMB. L. REV. 1757, 1771 -72(Nov. 2002) (Foreign listings on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") have grown from 3.5% of
total NYSE listings in 1985 to nearly 170o in 2002).
14. See supra note 1.
15. Coffee, supra note 13, at 1770 71.
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In 1990, 352 [ADR] programs from twenty-four countries were in effect
in the United States . . . by 1999, this number has grown to 1,800
programs from 78 countries . . . the number of foreign companies listed
on the two principal U.S. stock exchanges (the NYSE and Nasdaq) grew
from 170 in 1990 to over 750 in 2000. As of April 2001, over 970 non-
U.S. firms were listed on the NYSE, Nasdaq, or the Amex. [T]rading of
ADRs grew rapidly, reaching $1,185 billion in 2000.16
As a consequence of these transnational trading activities, prior to
Morrison fraud in securities markets had taken on an increasing
international flavor, with foreigners as investor-plaintiffs pursuing
remedies for market fraud exhibiting an inclination toward United States
courthouses. " The inclination has arisen because, in many ways, United
States processes seem, and are, more hospitable than foreign ones in
allowing the advancement of civil causes on account of securities fraud."
B. CASE LAW PRIOR TO MORRISON
Access to United States courts, however, is not unrestricted. Federal
courts have limited jurisdiction, bound in various ways by subject matter
jurisdiction, statute,1 and case by case decisions.2 Courts may neither
enlarge subject matter jurisdiction,21 nor diminish its scope, 22 withforum non
conveniens doctrine representing something of an exception to the rule.23
16. Coffee, supra note 13, at 1770-71. See also Foreign Issuer Reporting Enhancements, 73 Fed.
Reg. 58,300, at 58,301 (Foreign private issuers submit Form 20-F with the S.E.C. to register a class of
securities under the Exchange Act and annual reports in order to "elicit disclosures from foreign private
issuers that [are] as equal as practicable to that provided by domestic issuers.").
17. See supra note 3.
18. See Securities Policeman, supra note 3.
19. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559-660 (2005).
20. Id. at 554.
21. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct 1937, 1945 (2009) ("Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot
be forfeited or waived and should be considered when fairly in doubt.").
22. Federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise their jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); see also Village
of Westfield v. Welch's, 170 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1999). There are, nonetheless, several traditional
categories of abstention. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971) (abstention
appropriate where there is a pending state criminal proceeding); see also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315, 317-34 (1943) (abstention appropriate to avoid interference with attempts to establish
coherent state policy and issues of peculiarly local concern). Abstention also appropriate where "state
and federal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction simultaneously." See Village of Westfield, 170 F.3d
at 120 (quoting Burnett v. Physician's Online, Inc., 99 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also Dittmer v.
County of Suffolk, 146 F.3d 113, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1998). Thus, a "finding that the concurrent
proceedings are 'parallel' is a necessary prerequisite to abstention under Colorado River." Id. at 118.
Forum non conveniens doctrine also provides basis to decline jurisdiction. See infra note 19.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) allows a district court "[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice . transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
227Summer 2011
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Prior to Morrison, decisions analyzing whether foreign plaintiffs may
have access to United States courts often had framed the matter as one of
jurisdiction.24 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States defines subject matter jurisdiction as the power "to prescribe law
with respect to a person or activity."25 In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Calfornia,2 6 two justices bandied whether "legislative jurisdiction" may
better describe "subject matter jurisdiction." More recently, some courts
had begun to regard the question of whether § 10(b) applies internationally
as one of statute, not of the jurisdiction of federal courts to enforce
judgments that the statute had been violated. "[W]hen Congress does not
rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat
the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character." 27
Morrison resolved the issue of whether the transactional reach of §
10(b) implicated jurisdictional or merely statutory concerns. Writing for
been brought." On its face, §1404 does not authorize disallowance of jurisdiction where another
country may have jurisdiction, but "federal courts retain the inherent power to refuse jurisdiction of
cases not within § 1404(a) - cases which should have been brought in a foreign jurisdiction, rather than
in the United States." Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956). But to achieve this result, a defendant would have to show a "balance []
strongly in favor of' the move. Id. at 645-46. This may be difficult given the advantages to a foreign
plaintiff of pursuing securities fraud claims in the United States.
24. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876-77 (collected authorities). The Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982 ("FTAIA"), addresses subject matter jurisdiction of antitrust claims by
foreigners that purchased product outside the United States from United States purchasers. 15 U.S.C. §
6a (2009) (amending the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7). The FTAIA "clarifies that U.S. antitrust
laws concern the protection of American consumers and American exporters, not foreign consumers or
producers." In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig. ("DRAM"), 546 F.3d 981, 984
(9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and authorities omitted). "The FTAIA amends the Sherman Act and
excludes from [its] reach much anti-competitive conduct that causes only foreign injury." Id. at 985
(internal quotations and Supreme Court authority omitted). The court in DRAM explicitly recognized
that the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction may sometimes become tangled with a failure to have stated
a claim. Id. at 985 n.3. The court avoided having to untangle the issues because "the result and
analysis are the same" however the question was answered. Id.
In F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A. ("Empagran I'), 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004), the
Supreme Court made clear that foreigners could bring claims under the Sherman Act [the principal
federal antitrust provision] only -where [their] claim rests solely on the independent foreign harm"
(emphasis supplied). Independent does not mean that "foreign plaintiffs injured by a conspiracy that
also injured American purchasers could not sue under the Sherman Act." DRAM, 546 F.3d at 986 n.7
(internal quotations and authorities omitted). Requiring independent proximate cause "is consistent
with principles of comity-the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their
laws." Id. at 987 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
25. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law consists of international law as it applies to the
U.S., and domestic law that has impact on the foreign relations of the U.S. or has other in significant
international consequences. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(1); see also
Empagran , 542 U.S. at 164 ("prescriptive jurisdiction" referring to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW).
26. 509 U.S. 764, 796-98 n. 22 (1993).
27. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 526, 528-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 502 (2006)).
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the Court, Justice Scalia immediately addressed and decided what the
opinion called the "threshold error" of considering "the extraterritorial
reach of § 10(b) to raise a question of subject-matter jurisdiction." 28
Asking what "conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b)
prohibits, which is a merits question," not whether the tribunal has "power
to hear a case," which would be a jurisdictional query.29 in so answering,
Justice Scalia gave § 10(b) an extraordinary long reach in some
circumstances, as the necessary import of a decision that places any
security listed on domestic exchanges under the domain of § 10(b) is that
the United States, acting through securities laws, has the power to prescribe
consequences to a foreign issuer. This power would presumably apply
with equal force if the issuer's only ongoing contact with the United States
is by the listing of its ADRs on domestic exchanges. At I.C below, we
examine the correspondence between this unequivocal authority and the
Court's expressed concerns about the comity implications of allowing §
10(b) to reach transactions on a foreign exchange.
C. ANALYSIS OF MORRJSON
Holding that the issue before the Court implicated only statutory
interpretation, the Court turned to whether § 10(b) indeed enjoyed
extraterritorial reach." The Court began its work on the merits of the
Morrison controversy by rehearsal of the noncontroversial principle that
"legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."3 1 The Court
added that, "[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none." 32 Here, the Court looked initially for precedent,
28. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876-77.
29. Id.
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402. "[T]he jurisdiction of the
United States to prescribe is governed by the Constitution, and is limited by the Bill of Rights." Id. at
cmt. j. In Int'l. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945), the Supreme Court held that due
process requires that a defendant have "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"'
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The due process test therefore has two parts:
the "minimum contacts" inquiry and the "reasonableness" inquiry. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-
Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1996).
Where the claim arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum, minimum contacts exist where
the defendant "'purposefully availed' itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum and could
foresee being 'haled into court' there." See Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez,
305 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)),
where specific jurisdiction exists when a defendant has "'purposefully directed' his activities at
residents of the forum . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to'
those injuries.").
31. Morrison, 130 5. Ct. at 2877.
32. Id. at 2878.
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not to a decision involving the securities laws at all, but of the reach of
Title VII, American civil rights legislation, EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co
("Aramco")." The essential Aramco issue was whether Title VII's
protection extended to United States citizens employed abroad.34 Justice
Scalia's use of that decision is discussed below. This was prelude to the
majority's observation that, before Morrison, decisions interpreting the
extraterritorial reach of the Exchange Act had awarded themselves wide
interpretive authority because, in their view, the Act was "silent as to the
extra territorial application of § 10(b)."3 5 Justice Scalia surveyed the case
law that had been developing over four decades, summarizing, accurately,
that whether the Exchange Act applied transnationally had involved case
by case inquiries depending ultimately on significant conduct in the United
States and some effect on American securities3 or more recently an admix
of conduct and effects." The Court observed, undeniably in this instance,
that where as here courts felt authorized to "discern" what Congress would
have written had it thought about the topic, the resulting decisions had
become "complex in formulation and unpredictable in application."38
The Court next examined the text of the Exchange Act for what it
revealed about its extraterritorial application. The concurrence39 acidly
characterized this part of the decision as "Justice Scalia's personal view of
statutory interpretation." 40 That personal view treated the Act's definition
of "interstate commerce," a term also appearing in § 10(b), as including
activity "between any foreign country and any State," 4 1 as the sort of
"general reference" that the decision in Aramco had given permission to
disregard.42 Justice Scalia similarly diminished the part of the Exchange
Act's statement of purposes that "prices established and offered in such
transactions are generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United
States and foreign countries" as not intended to connect America's national
33. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
34. Cf., in Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982), the plaintiff had claimed
that it had been "treatied-out" from application of Title Vll. The Court disagreed. It held that the
domestic subsidiary of a Japanese company was not exempt from Title VIl's employment
discrimination laws.
35. 130 S. Ct. at 2878.
36. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
37. 130 S. Ct. at 2877, et seq.
38. Id. at 2878. The right of Americans to use § 10(b) purchasing abroad shares of a foreign issuer
listed both on United States and foreign exchanges was constant. See discussion, supra note 6.
39. Id. at 2892. Never was a "concurrence" more misnomered than Justice Stevens's. It concurred
in the conclusion that § 10(b) did not extend to the particular facts of the matter, but vehemently
dissented from the holding.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2882 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17))
42. See discussion, supra note 25.
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public interest to activities in foreign exchanges and markets. 43 Demoting
the Act's allusion to foreign countries to a "fleeting reference," the Court
concluded that the reference could not overcome the general presumption
against extraterritorial application, and that § 10(b) could not therefore
reach purchases of securities listed on foreign exchanges.44
Over several pages the Court next wrestled with § 30(b) of the
Exchange Act.45 That section specifically mentions the Act's
extraterritorial application, 46 and expressly provides the SEC with the
power to regulate "to prevent evasion of [the Act]," 47 power that the SEC
does not appear to have exercised with respect to that section. The Court
confined § 30's reference to extraterritorial application to § 30, insisting
that the language was not intended to apply Act wide-"why would the
Commission's enabling regulations be limited to those preventing 'evasion'
of the Act, rather than all those preventing 'violation."' 4 8 The Court went
on to pronounce that § 30(a) represented the "clear statement of
extraterritorial application" that § 10(b) lacks, 49 and that the specificity in §
30(a) "would be quite superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already
applied to transactions on foreign exchanges."50
Justice Scalia finished up the majority's work with an array of
miscellaneous arguments, many to refute those of the concurring opinion.
Noting that Congress had reversed by legislation the Supreme Court's
rejection in Aramco of Title VII's extraterritorial application, the Court
declared that, "[T]his shows [] that Congress knows how to give a statute
explicit extraterritorial effect."51 Next, by repeating that text controls and
all that matters from the point of view of § 10(b) text are "purchases and
sales of securities in the United States," the Court gave little if any weight
to the domestic consequence of excusing from § 10(b) foreign transactions
in securities traded both on foreign and domestic efficient markets.52 The
Court stated, "it is our view only transactions in securities listed on
43. 130 S. Ct. at 2882 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2)).
44. 130 S. Ct. at 2885 n.10.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b).
46. See discussion, infra § 30.
47. 130 S. Ct. at 2882.
48. Id. This seems a paradigmatic distinction without a meaningful substantive difference, as in
the end to implicate § 10(b) any evasion must be a violation in order.
49. "Subsection 30(a) contains what § 10(b) lacks: a clear statement of extraterritorial effect. Its
explicit provision for a special extraterritorial application would be quite superfluous if the rest of the
Exchange Act already applied to transactions on foreign exchanges-and its limitation of that
application to securities of domestic issuers would be inoperative. Even if that were not true, when a
statute provides for some extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality operates
to limit that provision to its terms." Id. at 2883.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2883 n. 8.
52. Id. at 2884.
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domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to which§ 10(b) applies."5 3  The Court expressed the belief that, if Congress had
intended §I10(b) to apply internationally, as plaintiff urged, that law would
have conflicted with laws of other nations, and therefore lawmakers would
have been explicit about their geographic intentions. 54
Finally, the majority addressed the SEC submissions to the Supreme
Court. In them, the SEC had made known that in its view a '"significant
and material conduct' test" aligned with contemporary notions of comity,
and recommended that § 10(b) should apply where "the fraud involves
significant conduct in the United States that is material to the fraud's
success."5 5  The Court ignored the SEC on comity, and denied Chevron
deference56 to the SEC because, inter alia, the agency relied on decisions
by courts rather than provide its own statutory interpretation.57
The Court rejected the position advanced by the SEC for the
additional reason that, in the Court's view, there was no textual support for
it. The Court thus diminished to nought the authority of citations by the
SEC to other instances where domestic conduct with consequences abroad
had been regarded as within a statute's scope notwithstanding that United
States law had not specifically conferred that authority." The Court
distinguished decisions extending the Lanham Act59 extraterritorially
because that Act defines commerce as "all commerce which may lawfully
be regulated by Congress," and the Exchange Act does not.60
In dicta that likely revealed how the majority came to decide as it did,
the Court stated that it surely wished to avoid any result that would
transform United States courts into a "Shangri-La of class-action litigation
for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities
53. 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2886 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 08-
1191,2010 WL 719337, at *16 (Feb. 26, 2010)).
56. See in/ra note 103.
57. 130 S. Ct. at 2887.
58. Id. at 2887 n. 11.
59. The Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127, houses, but not exclusively, federal
statutes concerning trademark law. Unstated was that the Lanham Act has a section (1127) dedicated to
"[c]onstruction and definitions; intent of chapter." The Exchange Act has a definitions section, but
otherwise does not have a section corresponding to that of the Lanham Act. What the Exchange Act
does have, inter alia, is a section headed "Necessity for regulation," and that section both states that
national public interest requires that securities transactions "as commonly conducted upon securities
exchanges" be regulated and controlled, and recognizes that such transactions "in large part originate
outside the States"; and that the prices established "are generally disseminated and quoted throughout
the United States and foreign countries and constitute a basis for determining and establishing the prices
at which securities are ftraded]." 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
60. 130 S. Ct. at 2887 n. 11 (citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252).
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markets."*6  An earlier Supreme Court had regarded private actions as a
"necessary supplement" to the enforcement activities of the SEC.62
III. THE MORRISON DECISION, AN EVALUATION
A. DISCERNING COURTS LEAD TO CONFUSING LAW
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 came into being in response to
the Great Crash of 1929. The Act governs the secondary trading of
securities (stocks, bonds, and the like) following their registration and
initial public offerings, and "[t]he antifraud provisions of the securities
laws have been held to reach beyond the registration requirements of the
1933 Act." 63 The distinction is drawn from the different language of the
laws, and the view that 1933 Act registration requirements are more likely
to be peculiar to the United States than the Exchange Act's anti-fraud
measures, and accordingly the 1933 Act registration requirements would be
the more invasive of another country's internal business affairs. By
contrast, it is felt-perhaps naively-and has been expressed, that the
capital world universally abhors fraud.64  So, "[w]hile registration
requirements [of the variety demanded by the 1933 Act] may widely vary,
anti-fraud enforcement objectives are broadly similar as governments and
other regulators are generally in agreement that fraud should be
discouraged."
By the 1970s, securities transactions increasingly crossed national
borders, and the American class action device provided a mechanism to
redress fraud in connection with those transactions. It was not long before
courts were being asked whether § 10(b) applied to securities of foreign
issuers that had been acquired abroad by foreigners (the so-called "F-
cubed" investor). In 1975, the question was put to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in a panel of judges led by the highly respected Chief
Judge Friendly." That case was Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,67 which
61. 130 S. Ct. at 2886. The decision as a whole remarkably unaware of the kinds of transnational
activities that do occur, and that some times do in fact allow activities in one nation to allow fraud to
infiltrate securities exchanges across the globe. Consider the facts of SCOR, 537 F. Supp. 2d 556,
discussed supra note 6.
62. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382 (1970).
63. Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London ("EOC"), 147 F.3d
118, 127 (2d Cir. 1998); Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, et seq. (2009).
64. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd. ("National Australia Bank"), 547 F.3d 167,
174-75 (2d Cir. 2008) (where the second circuit engaged in mini-survey).
65. Id. at 175. This rationale would seemingly translate to a good neighbor founded on mutual
enforcement of any malefactor who has transacted business in one's forum.
66. Judge Henry J. Friendly (1903-1986), United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1959
through 1974, Chief Judge, 1971 to 1973. See Friendly, Henry Jacob, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/serylet/nGetlnfo?jid=802&cid=999&ctype- na&instate-na (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
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immediately became the touchstone for thirty-five years of jurisprudence
concerning § 10(b)'s extra-national reach.
Bersch held that "merely preparatory activities in the United States
[that concluded with the fraud complained of] are not enough to trigger
application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located
abroad . . . ."68 In formulating that standard, the court in Bersch freely
admitted that it could not "point to language in the statutes, or even in the
legislative history,"6 hypothesizing instead that, in enacting the securities
laws during the 1930's, Congress "could hardly have been expected to
foresee the development of off-shore funds thirty years later." The
court's "legislative" authority itself claimed ancient provenance, Heydon 's
Case,7 1 as source of it fanciful powers of legislative interpretation.
Heydon's Case states:
The true reason of the remedy: and then the office of all the Judges is
always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force
and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the Act,
pro bono publico.72
Although Judge Friendly believed that the court was obliged to
operate in the arena of surmise, the test that the court developed was not
wholly invented. Rather, as discussed above, once peeled of the "conduct
and effects test" label, the process bore resemblance to that employed by
courts seeking to identify whether a forum had "minimum contacts" of
various kinds sufficient to obtain personal jurisdiction. Whether a matter
fell on one side or the other of the jurisdictional line generally involved
case by case work, work that has been done in thousands of cases in a wide
array of law applications, an activity consistent with how the law
commonly develops. And so while Bersch authorized itself and its many
successors, to interpret what Congress's intentions "would be"; that is,
what they would have been had Congress thought about the possibility of
67. Bersch, 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
68. Id. at 992.
69. Id. at 993.
70. id.
71. 3 Coke 7a, 76 E.R. 637 (1584). The principle of Heydon's Case may have been sterilized to fit
the decision in Bersch. Moreover, Heydon's Case was not decided in a governmental environment that
sought to maintain a firm partition between the legislative and judicial branches. And what if there is
nothing to construe and no statutory intent regarding the subject matter brought to court? What if what
the law, here § 10(b), actually says collides with the court's construction?
72. Id. at 638-39. To similar end, Justice Cardozo (1870-1938), U.S. Supreme Court justice 1932
to 1938, urged courts to assume the duty "to make more profound the discovery of the latent meaning of
positive law." BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 15 (Yale
University Press 1964) (1921) [hereinafter THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS].
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having intentions, much less actually had them, the license was intended to
operate within a familiar judicial methodology.
In the event, 73 the Bersch claim that "the SEC has provided no such
guidance [respecting the extra-national reach] for the anti-fraud provisions
of the 1934 Act, leaving the courts to decide the application of § 10(b) with
reference to the statute and its purpose and history" was not entirely
accurate.74 The Exchange Act as a whole shows awareness of a financial
world beyond the borders of the United States in a way that makes clear
that Congress did consider transnational financial activity, and was not
necessarily adverse to transnational application of that Act.
Repudiating decades of law, out of which had developed the principle
that the international reach of the Exchange Act's § 10(b), would depend
upon significant domestic misconduct and its effect on domestic
investors-as well as a showing that the misconduct caused the foreign
investors claimed losses. The Court insisted that, where courts gave
themselves license to "discern" what Congress would have legislated had
they thought about it, results become "complex in formulation and
unpredictable in application."" Here, the majority opinion cannot be
gainsaid.76 Judicial analyses developed in this area have confused, if not
actually degraded, legal principles in order to arrive at desired, but not
necessarily desirable, outcomes respecting access to United States courts
and availability of § 10(b) to foreigners who purchased a foreign issuer s
shares on a foreign exchange-the F-cubed plaintiff.77
73. EOC, 147 F.3d 118.
74. Id. at 128 n. 11. The concept of legislative silence continued into Morrison briefs filed with
the Supreme Court. "The text of the Exchange Act is silent as to its transnational reach." Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191),
2009 WL 3460235, at *6 (citing Itoba, 54 F.3d at 121).
75. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878.
76. "When a court declares that a certain interpretation will lead to undesirable consequences and
is therefore to be avoided, the striking quality of this declaration is usually the grave doubt it elicits as
to the accuracy of the forecast." Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 878
(1929-30).
Decades before Judge Friendly enabled courts to read the minds of Congress regarding a subject about
which it allegedly never had in mind, Professor Harry W. Jones (1911-1993), Cardozo Professor
emeritus at Columbia University Law School, advocated this very kind of judicial activity. Where
"[t]he thought of the members of the legislature, or any of them, may never have been directed, even in
the most general outline, to the essential interpretative issue of a case at bar. . . judges must frequently
act legislatively in determining the legal effect to be given to a statute. . . . [In so doing], [t]he phrase
'legislative intention' may be taken to signify the teleological concept of legislative purpose, as well as
the more immediate concept of legislative meaning." Harry Willmer Jones, Statutory Doubts and
Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 957, 972 (1940) (emphasis in original).
77. "The fact is," said Gray in his lectures on The Nature and Sources of the Law, "that the
difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the Legislature has had no meaning at all; when the
question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what the judges have to do is, not to
determine what the Legislature did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it
would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the point had been present." JOHNm CHIPMAN
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More particularly, since 1975, Bersch's "conduct and effects" test that
wants more than "merely preparatory" conduct in the United States that
cannot be "relatively small to those abroad" had degraded into something
of a farrago that variously has been described as "substantial acts in
furtherance of;78 "causes, or plays a substantial part in causing, harm" to
F-cubed plaintiffs; 79 United States activities that are the source and focus of
the fraud cannot satisfy "conduct" because they are merely the object of the
fraud;80 fraud on the market theory81 may not be used to show injuries to F-
cubed class plaintiffs;8 2 one looks to where the fraudulent statements
emanate, unless the mastermind was in the United States, unless perhaps
the mastermind's final fraudulent thoughts occurred outside the United
States.8 And sometimes what really matters is "what conduct comprises
the heart of the alleged fraud."84 Cases routinely had allowed U.S.
investors to proceed while closing courthouse doors to the F-cubed
investor, that is, the foreigner purchasing a foreign issuer's securities on a
foreign exchange. Assuming the defendant had shares or ADR equivalents
available for sale in the United States, courts had been finding subject
matter jurisdiction over class claims by U.S. residents purchasing abroad
even while rejecting those by foreigners.
GRAY LL.D., THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 165 (1909); THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS, supra note 56, at 15 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
78. Psimenos v. IF.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983).
79. EOC, 147 F.3d at 128.
80. Rhodia, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 539-40 ("The activities in the United States were "merely a link in
the chain of the overall scheme. . . engineered by foreign corporations on foreign soil").
81. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension, Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 199-200
n.4 (2d Cir. 2008) ("The Basic Inc. v. Levinson [485 U.S. 224 (1988)] fraud-on-the-market theory
involves two rebuttable presumptions that permit a finding of class-wide reliance with respect to a Rule
10b-5 claim: 'that (1) misrepresentations by an issuer affect the price of securities traded in the open
market, and (2) investors rely on the market price of securities as an accurate measure of their intrinsic
value.' Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2004). It is 'based on the hypothesis that, in
an open and developed securities market, the price of a company s stock is determined by the available
material information regarding the company and its business' and that '[m]isleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.'
Basic, 485 U.S. at 241 242, 108 S. Ct. 978. The theory is premised on the existence of an
informationally efficient market, in which 'market professionals generally consider most publicly
announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock prices.' Id. at 246 n.24, 108
S.Ct. 978.").
82. In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig. (Bayer I), 423 F. Supp. 2d 105 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("In light of
this Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs have not established the conduct necessary to extend subject
matter jurisdiction over the Foreign Purchasers, the Court declines to engage in a purely advisory
discussion of Plaintiffs' fraud on the market theory. This Court notes, however, as it did in Bayer I [In
re Bayer AG Sec. Litigation (Bayer 1), No. 03 Civ. 1546 WHP, 2004 WL 2190357, at *18 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2004)], that when considered by other district courts, this theory has been rejected.").
83. See Bayer II, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 111; SCOR, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2008);
Berger, 322 F.3d at 193.
84. National Australia Bank, 547 F.3d at 175.
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Where the aggrieved plaintiff happened to have been an F-cubed
foreign investor purchasing a foreign issuer's securities on a foreign
exchange, courts had precluded the F-cubed plaintiff from using "effects"
alone to establish jurisdiction, that "effects" as a basis upon which to justify
jurisdiction was available only to United States citizens. "[T]he effects test
concerns the impact of overseas activity on U.S. investors and securities
traded on U.S. securities exchanges."" Accordingly, the effects test
"cannot be satisfied by foreign plaintiffs who are foreign investors who
purchased shares of [ ] a foreign corporation, on a foreign exchange. . . .
The 'effects test' is only meant to shield domestic investors and domestic
markets from the effects of securities frauds perpetrated elsewhere."86
Courts generally had decided not relevant, or at least not paramount, in
determining subject matter jurisdiction that a foreign scheme had adverse
"generalized effects" on United States financial markets. 8 7
Perhaps, though, class actions represent instances where the "conduct
and effects test" had been most artificially employed. In Bayer II the court
denied class certification on the ground that "only eight percent of Bayer
AG's shares" were traded in the United States, too little, in the court's
view, to obtain jurisdiction over the foreign issuer-"a very small tail may
be wagging an elephant" was how the court put it.88 Omitted was that the
tail weighed in at approximately $2 billion of Bayer market capitalization.8 9
The court in Royal Dutch expressly wrote that "class actions may require
different treatment."90
Against this background, one can readily see how the Court in
Morrison concluded that the "conducts and effects test" has become
complex and unpredictable. Yet, in the 35 years of its articulation,
modification, and application by numerous appellate and other courts,
neither the SEC nor Congress had acted as if they had seen a need to do
away with the premise of the Friendly-Bersch standard, viz., § 10(b) may
reach beyond domestic borders under certain principled conditions.
Moreover, by couching "conducts and effects test" as jurisdictional, Bersch
created a tool sufficiently flexible to protect investors without hauling
before American courts foreign issuers having only exiguous contacts.
Tellingly, when the Supreme Court in Morrison called upon the SEC's
85. EOC, 147 F.3d at 128. This does not quite seem accurate. Given that foreign plaintiffs also
must show that the conduct caused their injuries abroad, their claims too are subject to an "effects test."
86. Rhodia, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 538. To be precise, while correct that F-cubed plaintiffs cannot
avail of the effects test for subject matter jurisdiction purposes, it was available to American investors
who had purchased abroad so long as domestic markets were affected. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.
87. 519 F.2d at 987-89.
88. Bayer II, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 110-13.
89. See BAYER GROUP, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 69 (2006) ("Market capitalization at year end ...
E25.8 billion [US $21.67 billion]"), available at http://www.investor.bayer.comluser _upload/485/.
90. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
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views regarding § 10(b)'s extra-national extension, the SEC neither sought
to dispense with the "conduct and effects test," nor otherwise maintained
that § 10(b) entirely lacked international reach. Rather, the SEC sought
only to make uniform the standard for measuring (mis)conduct-§ 10(b)
should apply where "the fraud involves significant conduct in the United
States that is material to the fraud's success." 9 1
B. "JUSTICE SCALIA'S PERSONAL VIEW OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION"
That was how Justice Stevens put it, and if by that he meant that
Justice Scalia imposed an idiosyncratic gloss on the text of the Exchange
Act, Justice Stevens seems correct.
1. Section 10(b)
As laid out above, the Court repudiated decades of recognition that §
10(b) did have an extraterritorial aspect. The Court did so following
numerous pages stuffed with policy. The Court used the history of
unpredictable application of the "conduct and effects" test to conclude that
the criticisms of the test that the Court had gathered "seems to us justified."
So far so good. But then, in a self-indulgent non sequitor, Justice Scalia
insisted that the criticisms per force "demonstrate the wisdom of the
presumption against extraterritoriality." 92  To be sure, the criticisms may
have invited, perhaps necessitated, clarity or sharpening of standard, as the
SEC had urged, but it certainly did not oblige a presumption against
extraterritoriality. Regardless, the Court then sought to explain how §
10(b)'s text did not defeat that presumption.
The Court acknowledged that "interstate commerce" used in § 10(b),
and defined by the Act, includes the use of an "interstate instrumentality"
between "any foreign country and any State." Overlay the definition of
"interstate commerce" onto § 10(b), and the law reads, "it shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means of
instrumentality of any foreign country ... to use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
91. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886, citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, 2009 WL 3460235, at *16. That the standard would require case by case application to
particular facts is a commonplace in respect of § 10(b) litigation, and generally in a country whose laws
evolve case by case, rather than by application of a rigid Napoleonic Code. Perhaps, though, the
nation's laws may be moving to the Jesuitical style argument where characterizing a lie as an "economy
of truth" would be lauded formulation.
92. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881.
93. Id. at 2882; 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(17) ("State' meaning any one of the United States (15 U.S.C.§
78c(a)( 16)).
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exchange . . any manipulative or deceptive device," etc., a transaction
consistent with a clear rebuttal of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.4 Consistently, for decades, the SEC had regarded the
definitional reference to "foreign country" as "statutory language that
reflects Congress' belief that the remedial purposes of the securities laws
could not be realized if jurisdiction, particularly as to the antifraud
provisions, were limited to wholly domestic transaction."
To avoid the force of this interpretation, Justice Scalia decided to
regard as key the phrase "in connection with," decreeing that the defined
reference to "foreign country" does not work to defeat the presumption
against extraterritorial application.96 By placing the greatest emphasis on
the phrase "in connection with," Justice Scalia limited § 10(b) to
transactions on national exchanges. By using "in connection with" to limit§ 10(b) to "a national securities exchange," the court ignored decades of
judicially expansive interpretations of "in connection with," most famously
expressed in Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, that courts
should broadly construe the phrase "in connection with" the "purchase or
sale of any security."97 The mandate of broad construction had been taken
to heart in a legion of authorities, including those where misrepresentations
do not actually directly concern securities being traded98 and treatises.99 By
narrowing § 10(b) to purchases of securities listed on domestic exchanges,
94. The Act does not limit "exchange" to domestic. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) ("'[E]xchange' means
any organization, association, or group of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which
constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and
sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly
performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally understood, and includes the market place and
the market facilities maintained by such exchange.").
95. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, lIT v. Comfeld,
619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-7084), 1979 WL 200202 at *12. For illustrations of another
agency brief advocating transnational reach of the securities laws, see Brief of the Securities and
Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, Europe and Overseas Commodity
Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1998) (No. 96-7900), 1997 WL
33489165, at *8, et seq.
96. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881-82.
97. 401 F.2d 833, 861 (2d Cir. 1968) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied,
Coates v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n., 394 U.S. 976 (1968).
98. 991 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1993).
99. See, e.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.5[1] (6th ed. 2005)
(collecting a legion of authorities) [hereinafter HAZEN]. Hazen identifies a number of Supreme Court
decisions broadly reading the "in connection with" requirement including Carpenter v. United States,
484 U.S. 19 (1987), the heart of which was merely a reporter's heads up to friends about an upcoming
story; Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Zandford, which involved a broker's looting of client funds without
regard to any specific securities transaction. The rationale was that § 10(b) had as a general purpose to
encourage investor confidence by the assurance of honest markets. "Among Congress' objectives in
passing the [Exchange] Act was to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor
confidence' after the market crash of 1929." 535 U.S. 813, 824-25 (2002) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
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Morrison fails the longstanding mandate to encourage investor confidence
in connection with the assurance of honest markets. Foreign venues simply
do not have the protective force of § 10(b), certainly when used as a class
action expression.
There is no question that the inability of United States courts to
entertain aggregate claims by foreign investors will diminish the deterrence
authority of the federal securities laws. The defendants' law firm Sullivan
& Cromwell LLPoo said as much in a 2009 firm publication.'
Commenting on the dual-events of a $352.6-million settlement of a Royal
Dutch/Shell class action made in the Netherlands contingent on a refusal by
United States courts to certify a class that included F-cubed plaintiffs, the
firm expressed the belief that the shrinkage of class sizes occasioned by
exclusions of foreign investors may well "diminish the incentive for U.S.
plaintiffs' lawyers to bring class action suits on behalf of U.S. investors
alone . the few European statutes that might allow investors to bring
securities fraud claims as a class are narrow and largely unproven." 02
The Court then turned to purposes provisions, i.e., the Exchange Act's
statement of the law's necessity, 0 3 and as mentioned, characterized as
"fleeting," the reference to foreign countries in connection with the law's
necessity because the "prices established and offered in such transactions
[in securities as commonly conducted on exchanges] are generally
disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and foreign countries
and constitute a basis for determining and establishing the prices at which
securities are bought and sold..." 1 04 It hardly requires perception to note
that, what the Court regarded as "fleeting," the financial world regards as a
necessary commonplace. Possibly in anticipation of this rebuke, the Court
added that, "nothing suggests that this national public interest pertains to
transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges."i 0 5  Nothing? The Court
100. Sullivan & Cromwell LLP is an international law firm with headquarters in New York that
focuses on advising companies on mergers and acquisitions and on corporate law for industrial,
commercial, and financial clients, more than half of which are located abroad. See About S&C,
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, http://www.sullcrom.com/about/overview/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2011)..
101. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, DUTCH COURT APPROVES SETTLEMENT BETWEEN NON-U.S.
ISSUER AND 'CLASS' OF NON-U.S. CLAIMANTS (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.sullcrom.com/
files/Publication/78662dlId-43cf-4999-a836-158cffe3c83c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/04385e24-
b8Od-4ab7-bbfe-18601cf50767/SC PublicationDutchCourt ApprovesSettlement Between Non-
U.S. Issuer and %e2%80%9cClass%e2%80%9d of Non-U.S.pdf [hereinafter DUTCH COURT
APPROVES].
102. DUTCH COURT APPROVES, supra note 81, at 3-4. See also John J. Clarke, Jr., Keara M.
Gordon, Global Realm qf"Securities Class Actions; As U.S. courts grapple with jurisdiction over Joreign
investors' claims, other countries adopt elements similar to American model, N.Y. L.J., May 19, 2008,
at p. S4, col. 3.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
104. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2893 n.9 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2)).
105. Id at 2882.
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itself just noted how the statute recognizes that established prices are
equally disseminated and quoted globally. And for many decades, the SEC
recognized that narrow interpretations of these securities laws "could have
a significant adverse impact on the enforcement of the antifraud provisions.
These potential adverse consequences are of particular concern to the
Commission in light of the increasingly international character of securities
transactions and securities frauds."106
Lawmakers' recognition of the need to extend § 10(b) to foreign
countries because they influence the prices at which securities are
transacted both at home and abroad is manifestly consistent with the
developed and now discarded "conduct and effects test," and clearly rebuts
the Court's assertion that "nothing suggests that this national public
interest pertains to transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and
markets." The language of the statute per force recognizes that a pollutant
of prices on one exchange contaminates the other, and a statute that cannot
reach one cannot prevent contamination of the other. The statutory text
coupled to a secular understanding of how markets operate clearly rebuts
any claim of § 10(b) parochialism, the more so because the world's
efficient securities markets have grown increasingly entwined since 1934,
and with it the need for laws that recognize the uniform influences upon
foreign and domestic share prices. The Court should not have relegated
these irrefutable realities to the "fleeting" bin.
2. Section 30
The Court then addressed the explicit references to "foreign" in § 30
of the Exchange Act,' 7 headlined Foreign Securities Exchanges. Section
30(b) provides that the Act:
106. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, IIT v. Cornfeld,
619 F.2d 909 (1980) (No. 79-7084), 1979 WL 200202, at *1.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2009). Section 30 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd, enacted 1934,
addresses the degree to which the Exchange Act applies to transactions through foreign exchanges.
Foreign Securities Exchanges
Sec. 30. (a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to make use
of the mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the purpose of
effecting on an exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, any
transaction in any security the issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized under the laws
of, or has its principal place of business in, a place within or subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors
or to prevent the evasion of this Act.
(b) The provisions of this Act or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any
person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United
States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this Act.
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or any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar
as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the
United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter. 08
Although the section specifically refers to the entire "Act and any rule or
regulation thereunder," the Court limited the section's reference to
"without" United States activities to § 30, adding for benefit of its textual
analysis that § 30's references to foreign application possesses the explicit
quality that § 10(b) lacks.' 0 9 Allowing full merit to the Court's analytic
method, its conclusion gets matters backward. What § 30(b) did make
explicit was that its terms "shall not apply . . . without the jurisdiction of
the United States," unless in violation of an SEC rule.''o Section 10(b) has
no like limitation, and, again, § 30 states its provision applied Act wide.
As the SEC had once put it, "since Congress found it necessary to draft an
exemptive provision for certain foreign transactions and gave the
Commission power to make rules that would limit this exemption, the
presumption must be that the Act was meant to apply to those foreign
transactions not specifically exempted.""' So, if the true inference were
honestly to be drawn from the scrutinized § 30 language, it would have to
be that its framers intended the Act to apply without the United States
domestic jurisdiction unless its language explicitly says it shall not." 2
Section 30 thus shows, clearly, that: (a) Congress knew how to place
restrictions on the scope of the law, and that it knew how to make those
restrictions explicit when it wanted to; (b) set limitations on its reach when
it wanted to; and (c) seemingly presumed a reach that would capture
transactions without the United States intended to evade the law or SEC
regulation.' It is no surprise that the Exchange Act contains provisions
that reveal that Congress had been conscious of the world of international
finance-after all, issues of reparations and tariffs had been hotly debated
and in many ways dominated the international economic and political stage
since the conclusion of the First World War.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (emphasis added).
109. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (emphasis added).
I 11 . Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, llT v. Comfeld,
619 F.2d 909 (1980) (No. 79-7084), 1979 WL 200202, at *13 (quoting Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968) (emphasis supplied), rev'd in part on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (1968)
(en bane), cert. denied sub nom Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969)).
112. Of course, § 10(b) was not designed to protect against "evasion" of the Act, but it remains
redundant to have a law that proscribes evasion of another section of the same Act that already
proscribes speci fled misconduct.
1 13. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882.
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C. COMITY
Comity was Justice Scalia's next justification for proscribing § 10(b)'s
extraterritorial application. "The probability of incompatibility with the
applicable laws of other countries is so obvious," he wrote, "that if
Congress intended such foreign application 'it would have addressed the
subject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures."' 11 4  In his
concurrence, Justice Stevens helpfully reminds of recent Supreme Court
decisions where the Court had stated, "[a]s a principle of general
application . . . we have stated that courts should assume that legislators
take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations where
they write American laws.""' When he acknowledged the potential
extraterritorial range of § 30,116 Justice Scalia himself refuted his contention
that, had Congress wanted foreign application, it would have addressed
comity, which should have leant interpretive significance to the fact that §
30 has no Congressional statement regarding either conflict of laws, or
comity. Justice Scalia carried on notwithstanding, "the regulation of other
countries often differs from ours," citing discussions that almost entirely
have to do with varying treatments of class actions, not with disagreement
about fraud."
The concerns expressed by Justice Scalia are ostensibly those typically
of concern to comity; fundamentally, should one country's legal standards
be imposed on another. This was an important consideration in the Aramco
decision."' But substantive leitmotif in Aramco was whether America's
civil rights were intended to travel abroad with American employees, a
proposition that on its face seems an intrusive imposition of America's
particular mores on another nation. By contrast, the Sumitomo decision
involved a foreign entity electing to engage employees in the United States,
and under the banner of a domestic subsidiary." 9 Sumitomo 's fact pattern
hardly raises the spectre of undue intrusion.
Against a backdrop of professed comity concerns, one might suppose
the inquiry in respect of § 10(b)'s transnational extension and in Morrison
should have been whether application of § 10(b) to transactions on foreign
exchanges would be unduly intrusive or merely a predictable consequence
of a foreign entity's election to have some shares listed on a domestic
exchange or at least to transact a material part of its trade-as did National
Australian Bank-in the United States through the malfeasant subsidiary,
114. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 2882 n.7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id at 2882.
117. Id. at2885.
118. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 265.
119. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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coupled to a contacts style analysis of the wrongdoer's fraud-related
conduct in the United States. One could have expected genuine comity
deliberations to have considered the ways in which the foreign entity
elected to have a United States presence; for example, a process of this
kind may have examined this excerpt from a foreign issuer's (name
changed) recent presentation to the international financial community.
XYZ COMPANY OVERVIEW
*XYZ is an Australian oil and gas production company with all
of its assets in the USA
*The company is dual listed on the ASX and the NYSE AMEX
*Trades as XYZ in both markets
Under traditional long-arm or comity considerations, a foreign
enterprise that purposefully enters a jurisdiction both to solicit funds, to list
its securities for trading, and then touts its business in order to enhance the
value of these securities incurs the likelihood of finding itself falling
personally under that forum's jurisdictional authority. Considered too
would have been that potential F-cubed litigation invariably included
trading in securities listed both abroad and on American exchanges, and for
substantially alike reason substantially identical injuries to securities listed
both on American exchanges and listed abroad.' 20 Considered too would
have been that the foreign issuer elected to take the steps necessary to have
ADRs listed on domestic exchanges.' 2' Surely the foreign power that hosts
that enterprise could hardly claim intrusion where its enterprise elected to
have all its assets in the United States, elected to "dual list" its securities,
and elected to pitch internationally.
Consider too that nothing in the decision in Morrison universally
immunized foreign issuers from liability for evasion or even violations of §
10(b). To the contrary, Morrison expressly authorized purchasers, foreign
or domestic, of securities listed on American exchanges to act under that
law against issuers, foreign or domestic. This left the SEC with power to
pursue criminal penalties against a foreign issuer for fraudulent
misrepresentations on foreign soil that artificially enhanced the value of
120. Prior to Morrison, cases had begun to appreciate that, so long as a foreign market was
"efficient", material news introduced into it would have a highly correlated response to information
introduced on domestic exchanges. See, e.g., Marconi, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 578-79 (court does not reject
concept that shares trade in tandem on United States and London exchanges); Alstom, 253 F.R.D. at
280-82. Given that United States investors had been able to sue under § 10(b) for purchases on foreign
exchanges, that fraud-on-the market theorem applies to efficient foreign markets appears a necessary
inference. See explanation, infra note 171 (fraud-on-the market theory).
121. See supra note 1.
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securities listed on American exchanges.' 2 2 Prior to Morrison, courts
applied § 10(b) overseas only after satisfaction of a modified "minimum
contacts" examination d/b/a "conduct and effects test." For its part, the
SEC appears to have been highly mindful of the form of misconduct and
injurious effects as condition of actions that it brought against foreign
persons, sometimes solely on account of securities acquired abroad or even
acquired abroad by foreigners.' 2 3 Post-Morrison, anyone who purchases a
foreign issuer's shares on a domestic exchange is licensed to bring that
issuer into an American court solely on account of that transaction, and the
122. The SEC actuates criminal enforcement of the securities laws, including § 10(b), by referral to
the Department of Justice. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (authorizes
criminal penalties). See also Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1379
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (acknowledging the SEC's power to set in motion criminal proceedings).
123. See Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2003) (action against
foreign/offshore investment fund allowed to proceed because fraudulent scheme was masterminded and
executed in the U.S. and involved transactions on U.S. exchanges; criminal proceeding commenced and
defendant pled guilty to securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); see also Brief of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Appellee, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187 (2d
Cir. 2003) (No. 01-6254), 2002 WL 32330573 (2d Cir. June 28, 2002); Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v.
Banner Fund Int'l., 211 F.3d 602 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (action against principals of offshore unit investment
trust alleging that defendants defrauded U.S. investors into purchasing unregistered securities); Brief of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff-Appellee, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Banner Fund
Int'l., 211 F.3d 602 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 98-5235), 1999 WL 34833600 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1999);
Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977) (action against U.S. citizens, a
Canadian corporation and Delaware corporation, allowed to proceed although the sole victim was a
Canadian development fund and the securities at issue were never traded in or even exposed to
American markets or investors); Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th
Cir. 1973) (action against U.S. company and foreign/offshore mutual funds for securities fraud where
U.S. company sold shares in the offshore mutual funds to foreign and U.S. investors); Sec. and Exch.
Comm'n v. Benger, No. 09 CV 676, 2009 WL 1851186 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2009) (action against
foreign and domestic individuals and corporations for defrauding foreign investors into purchasing
Regulation S securities issued by companies incorporated or having administrative offices in the U.S.);
Plaintiff United States Securities and Exchange Commission's Response in Opposition to Relief
Defendants Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant
to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b), Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Benger, 09 CV 676, 2009 WL 1501608 (N.D. Ill.
April 2, 2009); Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Wolfson, No. 2:03CV914 DAK, 2003 WL 23356418 (D.
Utah Dec. 10, 2003) (action against foreign and domestic corporations and individuals for defrauding
foreign investors by deceiving them into believing that they were investing in small U.S. companies);
Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Batterman, No. 00 Civ. 4835 (LAP), 2002 WL 31190171 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2002) (action against foreign/offshore investment company and its principals alleging that the
defendants defrauded U.S. investors into purchasing the foreign company's unregistered securities);
Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Dowdell, No. CIV. A. 3:01CVOO16, 2002 WL 424595 (W.D. Va. Mar. 14,
2002) (action against foreign corporation and individual defendants alleging that they took part in a
Ponzi scheme, defrauding foreign and U.S. investors into purchasing debenture instruments issued by
the corporation); Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Princeton Economic Int'l. Ltd., 84 F. Supp. 2d 452
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (action against U.S. company and its foreign subsidiaries for selling fraudulent
promissory notes to foreign institutional investors); Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Vesco, 548 F. Supp.
1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (action against foreign corporations and shell corporations largely operated by
one U.S. corporation for defrauding foreign and domestic purchasers of securities traded both in the
U.S. markets and abroad).
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SEC may do so seeking criminal penalties. Morrison may be said,
therefore, to be less respectful of comity than was the predecessor doctrine,
and to advance the anomalous position that Congress intended to have
substantially the same conduct expose foreigners to criminal, but not civil
consequences.
Pre-Morrison judicial analysis of the transnational extent of § 10(b)
also seems to have paid more authentic heed to comity. American courts
asked to grade conduct and effects tests had been mindful of comity,124 and
generally had concluded that, setting aside issues concerning foreign
recognition of class judgments, concerns about conflicting laws and comity
were likely overstated in instances of fraud. As noted above, it has been
generally believed that the capital world abhors fraud.125  "[W]hile
registration requirements may widely vary, anti-fraud enforcement
objectives are broadly similar as governments and other regulators are
generally in agreement that fraud should be discouraged." 26
The "conducts and effects test" aligned with the conventional United
States concept that a party's personal susceptibility to a forum (personal
jurisdiction) will depend on the extent of the party's (minimum) contacts
with a forum. Akin to "conduct and effects,"' "minimum contacts" is a
fluid notion, meaning that the nonresident has "certain minimal contacts
with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
124. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 76, 96-107 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
125. National Australia Bank, 547 F.3d at 174-75 (the court engages in mini-survey).
126. Id at 175. This rationale would seemingly translate to a good neighbor founded on mutual
enforcement of any malefactor who has transacted business in one's forum. See Brief of the Securities
and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-0583-cv), 2008 WL
5485243 (citing Empagran 1, 542 U.S. 155, 164; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 416, note 3 (1987) ("In contrast to regulation under the antitrust laws, which not infrequently involved
prohibition of conduct which another state favored or required, . . . United States securities regulation ...
has not resulted in state-to-state conflict.")).
"[P]arties who 'reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with
citizens of another state' are subject to regulation and sanctions in the other State for the consequences
of their activities." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (quoting Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S.
643, 647 (1950)). Although neither the "unilateral activity' of a plaintiff nor "random," "fortuitous"
nor "attenuated" contacts by a defendant will support jurisdiction, jurisdiction over a defendant is
proper where the defendant's contacts "proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that
create a 'substantial connection' with the forum State." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75 (emphasis in
original). In determining whether a defendant has "minimum contacts" with the forum state, as under
the New York long-arm statute, courts may take into account the activities of a defendant's co-venturer
or agent to determine whether the defendant had minimum contacts with the forum state. See, e.g.,
Bonney v. Roelle, No. 96-1664, 1997 WL 407831, at **7-8 (4th Cir. 1997); Chrobak v. Hilton Int'l,
No. 06 Civ. 1916 (MGC), 2008 WL 4444111, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008); Hill v. Shell Oil Co.,
149 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("The joint venture . . . provides that the minimum contacts of
one co-venturer are attributable to other co venturers such that personal jurisdiction over one means
personal jurisdiction over all."); Stewart v. Adidas A.G., No. 96 Civ. 6670, 1997 WL 218431, at **4-5
(S.D.N.Y. April 30, 1997).
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traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"'2 7 and may be
flexibly applied. Reaching beyond a particular forum often is determined
by a local "long-arm statute." For commercial matters, these statutes ask
that consideration be given to the extent to which the defendants has been
doing or transacting business in the forum,128 also at bottom merely another
way of expressing minimum contacts.
Consistent with the view that the majority's comity concerns were
inflated, and that the pre-Morrison conduct and effects analysis had more
in common with customary judicial analysis, Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law § 402(1)(c) declares that, subject to § 403, a state
has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to "conduct outside its
territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory." This language of course is little more than "conduct" and
"effects" re-packaged in Restatement form, and comments to this section
impose no additional restrictions on any free judicial hand that might
happen to search within the Restatement for guidance. The Restatement
127. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984).
128. For extensive discussion and assembly of case authorities regarding doing business and
transacting business, general and specific jurisdiction, see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, CIVIL, 111069.2, 1069.3 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter FED.
PRAC. & PROCEDURE]. Essentially, doing business refers to a continuous and systematic business
activity in the forum, which would subject defendant to a claim for any cause. Transacting business
concerns "an isolated but purposeful business transaction in [the forum] and the plaintiffs claim arises
out of the particular transaction." McKinney's C.P.L.R. § 302 (2008), construed in Vincent C.
Alexander, Transaction of Business, In General, in SUPPLEMENTARY PRACTICE COMMENTARIES
C302:6 (2009). See also Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 423. State long-arm statutes trace their authority to
Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310, which in turn finds its roots in Pennoyer v. Neff 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877),
overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Notably, it has been written that it is the
relationship "among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" that are the primary points of analysis
when a controversy arises out of or is related to a defendant's contacts with the forum. Shaffer, 433
U.S. at 204. Contacts thus do not depend on plaintiffs contacts with the forum but on whether
defendant transacted a forum business and whether the cause arose therefrom. This begs, of course, the
meaning of "arises from."
129. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §402, Comment b.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §403(2) states:
Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined by
evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate: (a) the link of the activity to the
territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the
territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the
connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state
and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state
and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be
regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted. (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system; (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
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authors offer little aid, however, on what comprises "substantial." It is not
made clear whether intention requires conscious purpose or whether
reckless indifference will suffice, but vacant space of this kind is typical of,
and serves the purpose of, how principled law develops over time.
Thus, despite Justice Scalia professed hyper-sensibility to comity
concerns, in important ways the decision in Morrison is less respectful of
other nations' legal boundaries than the predecessor "conduct and effects
test."
In short, there seems little but air under the comity justification for the
decision. Indeed, elsewhere in Morrison, the majority acknowledged that,
if transnational application of § 10(b) by a "'significant and material
conduct' test" were authorized by the Act's text, "it would not violate
customary international law."130
D. DEFERENCE
Typically, the Chevron doctrine would oblige the Court to defer to an
agency's reasonable interpretation of its animating statute,131 and the SEC
urged the Supreme Court in Morrison to do that, to defer to the SEC's view
that § 10(b) does have international application and that a "significant and
material conduct" test should play the gatekeeper role in determining when§ 10(b) may go abroad. The Court refused to do that here. How did it
justify that refusal?
Justice Scalia elided Chevron by claiming that the Commission had
not provided its own interpretation of the statute, but instead merely had
"relied on decisions of federal courts-mainly Court of Appeals decisions. . . .)"132
The Court made no mention in this part of the decision that the SEC had
itself brought actions premised on existence of a transnational § 10(b).' 33
Nor did Justice Scalia offer any support for the suggestion that, in order to
earn Chevron status, an agency must label its interpretation as such. In
ostensible support of its analysis, Justice Scalia cited a pair of SEC
130. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887.
131. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ("Chevron"), 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984) (where legislature implicitly delegated responsibility of a particular matter to an
agency, generally courts may not overrule the agency's reasonable interpretation of the enabling statute,
and the pre-eminent power to regulate is not necessarily disturbed by prior court decisions that interpret
the underlying law in a manner inconsistent with the later regulation). See also Nat'l Cable &
Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). For illustration of where an
agency overstepped actual or implied authority, see Cuomo v. Cleaning House Ass'n, LLC, 129 S. Ct.2710, 2715, 2721 (2009). For illustration of the SEC overstepping its rule-making powers, seeGoldstein v. Sec. and Lxch. Comm'n., 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
132. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887.
133. See examples, supra note76.
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Releases. 3 4  Neither Release, however, states, implies, or hints, that an
agency must declare formally that it is interpreting law. These Releases do
however show the SEC making explicit adoption of circuit level authority
for the proposition that, as the SEC had put it in one of them, "[t]he
antifraud provisions of the securities statutes proscribe [use of the United
States as a base for a fraudulent scheme]. And it is now well settled that
this is so even when all the victims are foreigners." 35
Was the SEC's evident adoption of the "conduct and effects test"
sufficient to warrant, if not oblige, deference by the court in Morrison?
Until Morrison, the answer would have been yes.
According to Fed Prac. & Procedure § 8341, "two recent Supreme
Court opinions, Mead and Christensen, . . . suggest that statutory
interpretation undertaken in the course of formal adjudication must be
given the stiffer Chevron deference."136 In Mead, the court "recognized a
very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or
adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is
claimed."'" In short, recent Supreme Court vintage would appear to have
obliged deferential treatment by the majority.
The Morrison decision nevertheless asserts that deference was not
required because the SEC was not making its own interpretation of the
statute, but relying upon the Second Circuit's interpretation. Even if that
properly rendered inapplicable the stiff Chevron deference, it might still
have qualified for so-called Skidmore deference. Under Skidmore v. Swift
& Co.,'38 an agency decision merits "respect proportional to its 'power to
persuade.'" 39  "The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control." 40
134. In re Robert F. Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 11737, 1975 WL 160406 (Oct. 15, 1975); In
re Application of U.S. Sec. Clearing Corp. and Anthony James Miranti, Exchange Act Release No.
35066, 1994 WL 697646, at *3 nn.14, 16 (Dec. 8, 1994).
135. Lynch, 1975 WL 160406, at *4. In truth, the SEC had long since recognized and advocated the
transnational application of § l0(b). See, e.g., Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Amicus Curiae, 1979 WL 200202, passim; see also id., at nn. 2-4.
136. WRIGHT & MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROCEDURE § 8341 (West 2010); U.S. v. Mead Corp.
("Mead"), 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 585 (2001).
137. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229; see also Sec. and Exch. Comm'n. v. Zanford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-
20 (2002) (finding that interpretation of the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal
adjudication, is entitled to deference if it is reasonable).
138. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
139. Mead, 533 U.S. at 235.
140. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
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If the less rigorous Skidmore deference were applicable, whilst one
might well suppose that the Supreme Court in Morrison could have
concluded that the SEC's amicus arguments had not been persuasive, the
Court still should have been put to the task of accepting that, even by mere
reiteration of judicial interpretation, the SEC was expressing views that
warranted considerable deferential weight. That of course may be the
precise reason why the majority in Morrison refused to grant even that to
the SEC.
But even had the SEC explicitly labeled an interpretation of § 10(b) as
such, the Court says it would have rejected it, writing, in a manner that
might be taken as a sideways glance at Skidmore, that it need "accept only
those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of
construction courts normally employ." 41 The decision seems on tenuous
ground even here. We have already seen that the majority's methods of
statutory interpretation had departed so far from principle as to prompt
Justice Stevens to summarize them as "Justice Scalia's personal view of
statutory interpretation." And it seems rich with hauteur unreasonableness
to characterize as unreasonable agency interpretation of law that on its
essential belief in § 10(b)'s extraterritorial application aligned itself with
dozens of jurists, including those of renown, who had carefully considered
the issue over several decades.
The Court also licensed itself to disallow the SEC's interpretation of §
10(b) because the Court now disapproved of the cases that the SEC and
others had been citing for many decades. Apart from the bootstrap nature
of this argument, we add that, quite recently, in Stoneridge, to validate its
statutory interpretation that the very same § 10(b) does not extend to aiders
and abettors, the Court had looked to "the course of action" that Congress
had adopted in response to the Court's earlier decision on aiding and
abetting,142 and treated Congress's lack of response between that decision1 43
and Stoneridge as validation of the Court's textual explication.
The "conduct and effects test," whatever its flaws, has been on circuit
level display for 35 years. Should not Congressional lack of response to
this test validate at least the underlying proposition that § 10(b) extends
internationally? True, in respect of the question of aiding and abetting
Congress had been presented with a Supreme Court decision, and in the
case of § 10(b)'s extraterritorial reach it had not. Still, given the
prominence of the "conduct and effects test," 44 the eminent jurists who had
written on it, the SEC's consistent belief in § 10(b)'s extra-national
141. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887 (citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 260).
142. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 173-74 (2008).
143. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
144. Mentioned no fewer than 58 times at the circuit level, and no fewer than 179 times in district
court decisions.
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personality, lack of Congressional action respecting the premise of §
10(b)'s extraterritorial reach, and that the Court professed to place weight
on Congressional "course of action" or lack of it, it seems consistent, if not
reasonable, to read Congressional lack of response to the numerous
decisions on the extraterritorial scope of § 10(b) as lawmaker acceptance of
the law's international possibilities. But Justice Scalia said nothing of this
legislative "dog who didn't bark" about § 10(b)'s travels abroad. That
observant dog was left to lie.
IV. THE FUTURE
A. DESPITE MORRISON, PURCHASERS OF FOREIGN LISTED SECURITIES
WILL HAVE ACCESS TO UNITED STATES COURTS
1. Introduction
The Morrison decision will have varying impacts on the abilities of
large investors to pursue individual claims in federal courts and on smaller
ones attempting to advance class claims. Morrison will shrink, but
probably not extinguish, the ability of investors-American and foreign
alike-to recover money lost on efficient foreign markets, and to carry the
unintended consequence of an increase in the number of lawsuits initiated
in the United States.' 45 Both consequences suggested themselves in claims
that the New York State Pension Fund believed it may have had against
BP.
On June 30, 2010, within a week of the publication of Morrison, the
Financial Times reported that the Fund had planned to pursue a securities
claim against BP in federal court on account of the many shares of BP that
it had purchased on both America and foreign exchanges.14 6 Following
Morrison, the Fund thought that it would have to pursue claims associated
with its foreign purchases in foreign courts,147 an option that of course
145. Post-Morrison decisions to date have been unremarkable. In re Banco Santander Securities-
Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (Morrison applies even if the foreign
purchases were purportedly made "in connection with" another's purchase or sale of U.S.-traded
securities. Court dismissed claims by investors in a Bahamian fund that had invested in Madoffs
fund-even though plaintiffs claim to have made their Bahamian investment for the purposes of
indirectly investing in U.S. securities through Madoff); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., 10 cv 922,
2010 WL 3377409, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (Morrison bars claims by U.S. investors who
purchase securities on foreign exchanges); see also Sgalambo v. McKenzie, No. 09 Civ. 10087 (SAS),
2010 WL 3110349, at *17, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2010); see also Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F.
Supp. 2d 620, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
146. Michael Peel, New York Fund RethinIs BP Lawsuit, FIN. TIMES, June 30, 2010, p. 17.
147. Id. But see discussion supra regarding how the Fund may still be able to bundle all claims in a
single, federal venue.
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would not be at all available to smaller investors, including those who
would have been members of any class that the Fund would have led.148
Post-Morrison decisions have, if anything, enlarged the scope of that
decision.'4 9  In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation is a
securities fraud class action that had been tried to a jury over three months
ending January 2010, which resulted in a jury verdict for plaintiffs against
the company.' Vivendi had "listed" 500 million of its ordinary (foreign)
shares, but not for trading purposes; rather, to backstop the equivalent
number of ADR shares, and much of the class had purchased ADRs that
had been listed on the NYSE. The wrinkle was that all but 122 million of
the ADRs had migrated back to European markets.
Following the decision in Morrison, the court in Vivendi decided that
what Justice Scalia "really meant to say" was that § 10(b) reached only
securities that were both "listed and traded" on a domestic exchange.15'
Accordingly, the court held that the class could not capture the remaining
378 million listed but not traded shares because no purchases of them had
occurred on domestic markets.152  The court then narrowed the class
accordingly.'15
In In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., the district court dismissed
claims by United States investors who had purchased ADRs OTC in the
United States.154 The court was impressed by assertions that OTC did not
qualify as "an official American securities exchange [but] a less formal
market with lower exposure to U.S.-resident buyers."' 55  The decision in
Societe Generale adopted the explanation of a pre-Morrison decision that
trade "in ADRs is considered to be a 'predominantly foreign securities
transaction,"' a view that found no support in the more recent Vivendi
decision. 15
148. The Fund's dilemma raises the question of whether in the future a fiduciary/trustee breaches a
fiduciary duty by countenancing the investment of plan assets into securities listed on foreign
exchanges where the consequence is loss of§ l§0(b)'s protective powers.
149. Morrison's textual bound reading has resulted in the dismissal of non-securities related RICO
claims for want of explicit extraterritorial support in the statute. See Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access
Inds., 2010 WL 4968691, at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 2010); see also Cedeflo v. Intel Group, Inc., 733 F.
Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that under Morrison, RICO is presummed not to appy to
claims that are essentially extraterritorial in focus).
150. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation, No. 02 Civ. 05571(RJH)(HBP),
2011 WL 590915 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,2011).
151. Id. at *9.
152. In re Vivendi Universal, 2011 W L 590915 at *9.
153. Id. at *60.
154. No. 08 Civ. 2495 (RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *6, n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010).
155. Id at *6 (citation omitted).
156. Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citation omitted). See contra,
Kleinman v. Elan Corp., PLC, 10-cv-08761-AKH, slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2011) (Morrison
does not preclude claims based on purchase of ADRs or call options respecting them); also Stackhouse
v. Toyota Motor Co., 10-cv-1429, 2010 'WL 3377409, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (purchase of
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The word "official" does not however appear in the holding of
Morrison.17 ADRs unquestionably are securities, and Morrison explicitly
acknowledges that § 10(b) reaches "the purchase or sale of any other
security in the United States."' 58 Morrison moreover does not speak of any
kind of a "predominance" test; its purport is to dispense with the need for
ad hoc balancing work, which predominance tests generally require.
Morrison is, in a phrase, all about bright lines.' Societe Generale should
have fallen on the other side of that line.
In In re Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC Sec. Litig, plaintiffs
asserted 1933 Act causes concerning issuance of Rights ("Rights issue"),
and a separate 1933 Act claim based on an exchange offer ("Exchange
Offer").'" Both the Exchange Offer and Rights issue had prospectuses
filed with the SEC. The Exchange Offer was ordinary [foreign listed]
shares of ABN AMRO Group for Royal Bank of Scotland ("RBS")
ordinary [foreign listed] shares. The Rights issue provided opportunity to
acquire RBS ordinary shares, its prospectus explicitly stated that the
securities will not be registered or sold in the United States, and the offer
otherwise was not extended to the United States."' So dismissal of that
cause seems reasonable-not under Morrison, but, dissonantly, the
precedent body of balancing law that Morrison had overruled.
The prospectus for the Exchange Offer stated that it was made to all
shareholders "who are resident in the United States, and to all holders of
[9 ADRs, wherever located" pursuant to their own United States
prospectus.16 2  The court dismissed the claims in part by extending
Morrison to the 1933 Act via Morrison dicta that both Acts had the "same
focus on domestic transactions,"1 63 and then seemingly ignored Morrison's
bright line by the policy decision that, even if "listed" on an American
Stock exchange, "[t]rade in ADRs is considered to be a 'predominantly
foreign securities transaction.'"164
ADS's within § 10(b)); see also, In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 14, 2010) (dismissed claims of investors who purchased shares on a European exchange although
shares also registered and listed on the New York Stock Exchange).
157. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (2010).
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. Evidently, bright lines are difficult to paint. Vivendi, spoke of the "spirit" of Morrison in re-
writing what Justice Scalia had written. Vivendi, 2011 WL 590915, at *8.
160. No. 09 Civ. 300 (DAB), 2011 WL 167749, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2011).
161. Rights Issue prospectus filed with SEC on April 30, 2008, at p.59, §2.6.2.
162. Prospectus filed with SEC on July 30, 2007, at Part VII, p.49.
163. 130 S. Ct. at 2885.
164. In re Royal Bank, 2011 WL 167749, at *6-7 (citing Societe Generale, 2010 WL 3910286, at
*4). By focusing on the absence of an allegation that the acquired shares had not been purchased
outside the United States. Id. at *9.
Summer 2011 253
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Given that § 10(b) explicitly encompasses purchases or sales, that an
exchange of shares qualifies as a sale for § 10(b) purposes,165 and that
United States shareholders were told that they could exchange [i.e., sell]
their ADRs listed on an American Stock Exchange, 166 sales of ADRs into
the Exchange Offer should have enjoyed § 10(b) protection. They did not.
In Elliott Associates v. Porsche Automobil Holdings SE
("Porsche"),167 the court dismissed security-based swap agreements that
referenced the price of Volkswagen stock, notwithstanding that all actions
necessary to effectuate the swap agreements had occurred in the United
States. The swap confirmations were between and among the New York
venued investment managers and had been executed in New York. The
swap agreements contained choice of law and forum selection clauses
designating New York federal and local courts. 168  The court nevertheless
concluded that Morrison had swept away all § 10(b) claims for foreign
acquired securities, and according to the court, swap agreements are
equivalent to a buy order in the United States for a security traded abroad,
an equivalency that the court regarded as "eminently clear" based on an
"economic reality" test.169 The court however acknowledged that swaps are
securities in their own right.' Regardless, according to the court, § 10(b)
165. SEC v. Nat'l Secties, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969).
166. In re Royal Bank, 2011 WL 167749, at *8.
167. Nos. 10 Civ. 0532(HB), 2010 WL 5463846, at *2, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2010). On January
28, 2011, plaintiffs filed a notice to appeal the decision.
168. Contra Porsche, the court in RBS had found a foreign forum selection clause significant. In re
Royal Bank, 2011 WL 167749, at *9 n.14. The court in Porsche also found it notable that the
complaints had not attached the swap agreements or specifically identified the counterparties. Porsche,
2010 WL 5463846, at *2. That absence may be notable at a later stage of proceedings where plaintiffs
are put to actual proof, but, a motion to dismiss does not require evidentiary proof In deciding a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations are accepted as true, and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in plaintiffs favor. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191
(2d Cir. 2007); Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 532 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
On a motion to dismiss, the court's function is "not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a
trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Goldman v. Belden,
754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985). Nor should the court dismiss a complaint where the plaintiff has
stated "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The court in Porsche did not suggest that the
claim was implausible.
Rule 9(b) is triggered in claims of fraud. It requires that the complaint "(1) specify the statements that
the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements
were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent." ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund,
Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007). The decision in Porsche does not find Rule 9(b) failures.
169. Porsche, 2010 WL 5463846, at *5%.
170. Id. at *6 n3.
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as interpreted by Morrison means "purchases and sales explicitly solicited
by the issuer in the U.S.""'7
Although a purpose built decision like Morrison might arrive at the
same conclusion as the district court in Porsche, what is "eminently clear"
is that the decision in Porsche is analytically unsound. Swaps generally
settle in relation to the referenced instrument or index, and generally do not
result in the purchase or sale of an actual share of stock. The actual
holding of bright-lined Morrison was that § 10(b) explicitly reaches "the
purchase or sale of any other [than American Stock Exchange] security in
the United States." 72  The swap instruments in question were securities
purchased or sold in the United States. The decision in Porsche was
wrongly decided.
In Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance
Co., purchase orders were placed electronically by traders located in
Chicago, but the shares of the foreign issuer ultimately were purchased on a
foreign exchange. 173 The court held that for Morrison purposes a purchaser
does not per force occur where the order has been placed.17'4 Given that
local electronic purchase orders often may result in the purchase of shares
listed on any number of exchanges, the decision introduces Morrison to the
serendipity of where the broker executes the order, opening the theoretical
door to § 10(b) protection for shares ordered outside the United States that
happen to result in American executions.
Despite Morrison, there are means that will permit access to domestic
courts on account of securities traded in both the United States and abroad.
Investors, most simplistically, could sidestep Morrison entirely by
purchasing securities only on United States markets, regardless of where
else they may be listed. Fiduciaries should be especially sensitive to this
choice. Electing to purchase securities abroad that also could be acquired
on domestic markets would mean an elective loss of § 10(b) protection, an
election which could expose trustees to claims by their own beneficiaries.
Access to U.S. federal courts may also be possible by use of § 18 of the
Exchange Act.175 This law would serve primarily individuals having claims
171. Porsche, 2010 WL 5463846, at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
173. No. 08 Civ. 1958 (JGK), 2010 WL 3860397, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2010).
174. Id. at *8.
175. Securities Exchange Act § Sec. 18 provides:
Liability for Misleading Statements. (a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any
statement in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this Act or any rule or
regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in
subsection (d) of section 15 of this Act, which statement was at the time and in the light of
the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading)
who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which
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on account of securities purchased abroad where the purchases were made
"in reliance upon" filings made pursuant to the Exchange Act.
Morrison appears to have liberated certain state law securities-related
class claims from proscriptions imposed by the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA")." Thus, purchasers of
securities abroad also may be able to make use of state law causes of action
to gain access to federal courts. But if federal courts were foreclosed,
claims arising from state laws nevertheless could be prosecuted in state
courts. The opportunity for advancing state law claims, whether suing
individually or on behalf of a class, received a surprising and sharp boost
recently by the decision in Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd."' The
holding rejected what had been the increasingly established view that in
New York the so-called Martin Act178  precludes private suits based on
common law causes of action. Anwar held that the Martin Act does not bar
such claims, so long as they do not derive from or rely upon the Martin Act
to establish a required element of the claim.179 We deal with each of these
possibilities below.
was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued
shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an
undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant.
15 U.S.C. § 78r (2010).
176. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA"), Pub. L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77ccc, 78a-7811, 80a-b).
177. 728 F. Supp. 2d 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
178. Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-359 (McKinney 2010), provides in part:
I. It shall be illegal and prohibited for any person, partnership, corporation, company, trust
or association, or any agent or employee thereof, to use or employ any of the following acts
or practices:
(a) Any fraud, deception, concealment, suppression, false pretense or fictitious or pretended
purchase or sale,
(b) Any promise or representation as to the future which is beyond reasonable expectation or
unwarranted by existing circumstances;
(c) Any representation or statement which is false, where the person who made such
representation or statement: (i) knew the truth; or (ii) with reasonable effort could have
known the truth; or (iii) made no reasonable effort to ascertain the truth; or (iv) did not have
knowledge concerning the representation or statement made;
where engaged in to induce or promote the issuance, distribution, exchange, sale, negotiation
or purchase within or from this state of any securities or commodities, as defined in section
three hundred fifty-two of this article, regardless of whether issuance, distribution, exchange,
sale, negotiation or purchase resulted.
2. It shall be illegal and prohibited for any person, partnership, corporation, company, trust
or association, or any agent or employee thereof, to engage in any artifice, agreement. device
or scheme to obtain money, profit or property by any of the means prohibited by this section.
179. Anwar, 728 F. Supp.2d at 361.
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2. Jurisdiction/Choice of Law
Section 10(b) and the Exchange Act are not the sole route to federal
jurisdiction. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)'" sets out the conditions for
"diversity" jurisdiction. District courts shall have original jurisdiction of
controversies involving in excess of $75,000 between "citizens of a State
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state."' The permutations are
numerous, but at least carry the possibility that a foreign investor having
more than $75,000 in controversy could come into federal court to sue a
domestic issuer for common law fraud in connection with its securities
regardless of where they had been purchased. A citizen likewise could use
district courts to pursue a foreign entity. As a practical matter, diversity
based access would be available only to large investors, as their losses must
both satisfy the $75,000 threshold and support the substantial costs of
litigation.
Section 1332(a) deals with individual controversies. 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d) concerns class actions. That section requires district courts to take
jurisdiction over any class action involving $5,000,000, or more, and where
"4any member of a class of plaintiffs is a [ ] citizen or subject of a foreign
state and any defendant is a [ ] citizen or subject of a foreign state." 82 The
effect of § 1332(d) is that class actions begun in state courts often are
removed to federal courts.
Neither sub-section of § 1332 permits an alien plaintiff to sue an alien
defendant in federal court. Other § 1332 conditions being satisfied, both
sections, however, seemingly allow an United States citizen to use federal
courts to prosecute claims against domestic and foreign issuers on account
of securities listed on both an American exchange and abroad. The claims
180. Which provides:
Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between -
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a
State or of different States.
For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an alien admitted to the
United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such
alien is domiciled.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2010).
181. 28U.S.C. 1332(a)(2).
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(C), amended by Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), Pub. L.
No. 105-2, 118 Stat. 4 (2005).
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could take on hybrid expression. The cause on account of the securities
listed in the United States would rest on § 10(b); the cause for the
remainder would be common law fraud or similar actionable right. The
foreign plaintiff could likewise use § 1332 to pursue claims in federal
courts against a domestic issuer arising from purchases abroad of its
securities.
Accordingly, one enterprising complaint brought in federal court
involves a class of foreign plaintiffs asserting causes based on state
common law, not § 10(b). 8 3  Plaintiffs seek to take advantage of provision
that confers federal jurisdiction on class actions where members are foreign
and defendants domestic. 84  United States law firms also have gingerly
begun to bring collective actions abroad.'
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act bears on this
discussion.'86 In pertinent part, SLUSA states that "no covered class action
based upon the statutory or common law of any state or subdivision thereof
may be maintained in any state or federal court by any private party"
alleging causes lifted from § 10(b). A "covered class action" is defined
essentially as one brought on behalf of 50 or more persons concerning
"covered securities," which are defined by reference to § 18(b) of the
Securities Act of 1933."8 Section 18(b) of the 1933 Act defines "a covered
security" as one listed on a national exchange.'
SLUSA's statement of purpose 89 says that it came into being because,
since the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
183. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Dandong v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd.,
10-CV-8086, 2010 WL 4281248, at 11 293-389 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2010).
184. Id. at1|92 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(B)).
185. In January 2011, the Stichting Foundation, a special foundation backed by over 140
institutional investors and 2,000 individuals from U.S., Europe, Middle East, and Australia, filed a
shareholder fraud action in a Dutch civil court against Fortis N.V., currently known as Ageas NV/BV.
See http://www.investorclaimsagainstfortis.com/publication.php. See also Certification of Class, Silver
v. Imax Corp. (2009), CV-06-3257-00, at 11 164(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (court certifies global class).
186. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA"), Pub. L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77ccc, 78a-7811, 80a-b).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(E).
188. Which states:
(b) For purposes of this section, the following are covered securities:
(1) A security is a covered security if such security is
(A) listed, or authorized for listing, on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock
Exchange, or listed, or authorized for listing on the National Market System of the Nasdaq
Stock Market (or any successor to such entities);
(B) listed, or authorized for listing, on a national securities exchange (or tier or segment
thereof) that has listing standards that the Commission determines by rule (on its own
initiation or on the basis of a petition) are substantially similar to the listing standards
applicable to securities described in subparagraph (A).
15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)(1)(A)-(B).
189. SLUSA § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78a note.
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("PSLRA"), 19 0 "a number of securities class action lawsuits have shifted
from federal to state courts [which] has prevented that Act from fully
achieving its objectives [and accordingly SLUSA aims] to prevent certain
state private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used
to frustrate the objectives of the [PSLRA]." The PSLRA applies "in each
private action arising under this chapter that is brought as a plaintiff class
action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."1 9 1  "Chapter"
refers to Chapter 2B, the Exchange Act of 1934. The just quoted portion of
the PSLRA does not explicitly mention § 10(b).19 2
On its face, SLUSA does not apply to individuals, or even 49 of them,
and surely ought not apply to class actions seeking recoveries for fraud
alleged to have occurred in connection with securities listed abroad. These
securities ought not be regarded as "a covered security" because they are
not listed on a national exchange. And, given that Morrison held that §
10(b) does not apply as a matter of law to foreign listed securities, lawsuits
arising from such securities would not implicate the PSLRA (concerned
with actions "arising under this chapter") and in turn not implicate SLUSA,
which aims to prevent frustration of the PSLRA.'93 Thus, while Morrison
narrowed § 10(b)'s boundaries, it per force enlarged the territory in which
state causes may operate.
Class actions begun in state courts and then removed to federal courts
through the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") would be regulated by
federal class action standards following the 2010 decision by the Supreme
Court in Shady Grove.194 Shady Grove held that, once properly in federal
court, federal class action rules control certification processes and available
remedies, rejecting the argument that state law limitations on class
proceedings should carry over to federal class proceedings.9 Shady Grove
thus should facilitate the advancement of class actions in federal courts
based on state law claims, especially when attached to a federal claim; for
example, where class members acquired securities both on domestic and
190. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1).
192. Id.
193. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit ("Dabit"), the court held that SLUSA may
apply even where a § 10(b) was not specifically alleged. 547 U.S. 71, 84-89 (2006) However, in
Dabit, (a) securities were "covered"within meaning of SLUSA; (b) claims could have been brought or
at least arguably fell within § 10(b), and (c) plaintiff initially filed a complaint that encompassed what
could have been § 10(b) claims. Id. None of these conditions exists post-Morrison in respect of
securities listed abroad. Still, there is the risk that a result oriented court would extend Dabit.
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. P.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S.Ct. 1431
(2010).
195. 130 S.Ct. 1431 at 1456-57.
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foreign exchanges. Let's have the local considerations of New York court
actions stand in for many states.
New York's Supreme Court-the equivalent of a federal district
court-has "original, unlimited and unqualified jurisdiction and is
competent to entertain all causes of actions unless its jurisdiction has been
specifically proscribed."' 96 In Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of
America Sec. LLC. ("UMP"),197 international investors sued British Virgin
Island fund administrators in federal court under New York law over losses
stemming from BVI hedge funds. In UMP the "the overwhelming majority
of' investors were international and only four in New York, but the
"majority of the events" in the case and "the bulk of the relevant evidence"
were in New York. The UMP court further held, "[t]his case, involving a
large number of plaintiffs and defendants from many jurisdictions, can be
efficiently heard in the federal court in New York and this Court has a good
deal of experience adjudicating complex cases."' 98 Much of the conduct of
fraud and the management of the fund had taken place in New York.
Denying the forum non conveniens motion, 19 9 the UMP court held
"deference towards a plaintiffs choice of forum extends even to foreign
plaintiffs, where those plaintiffs are not forum shopping, but rather have
selected a forum for valid reasons, such as convenience." 200
Choice of law considerations also emerge where common law causes
are pressed. Applying New York choice of law rules, the court in UMP
noted that, if there is an "absence of substantive difference" among the
relevant jurisdictions, New York courts are "free to apply" New York
law.20' Where there is conflict, New York applies an "interest analysis,"
which for torts is determined by "the law of the jurisdiction where the tort
occurred . . . because that jurisdiction will have the greatest interest in
196. Matter of Fry v. Village of Tarrytown, 680 N.E.2d 578, 580 (N.Y. 1997); see also DAVID D.
SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE, note 1, § 12, at 16 (4th ed. 2005) ("[The Supreme Court is] the state's
only court of 'general' jurisdiction. This refers to original jurisdiction and means that the court has
almost all of the jurisdiction the state can confer.").
197. 446 F. Supp. 2d 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
198. Id. at 178.
199. Id. at 177-78. It is not likely that a federal court would use forum non conveniens to decline
jurisdiction over a plaintiff-especially one resident in the forum-who had simultaneous claims under
§ 10(b) for purchases made on domestic exchanges. The same prediction could not be made for the
foreign investor with no local contacts who acquired securities outside the local forum. Under New
York law, it is difficult to show deception within the state if the plaintiff had not been present in New
York. See, e.g., Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins., 746 N.Y.S.2d 858, 864(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (fraudulent
policy and scheme initiated in New York. Nevertheless, deception deemed to have occurred in Florida
where plaintiff resided, and where she read and purchased the policy); Mayfield v. Gen. Elec. Capital
Corp., No. 97-2786, 1999 WL 182586, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999) (no New York claim where
defendants in New York but solicitation occurred elsewhere).
200. UMP, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 191.
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regulating behavior within its borders."20 2  In UMP, "plaintiffs [were] an
international group, located in both New York and BVI" and "in locations
with only limited connection to the conduct at issue." 203  The court
nevertheless, applied New York law, stating that "New York has a strong
interest in applying its law with respect to defendants who aid and abet
torts masterminded and executed by hedge fund managers from within the
state."204
In Cromer,2 05 investors in an offshore investment fund managed from
New York brought a securities class action against Bermuda administrators
and auditors as well as their U.S. and international affiliates. Plaintiffs also
had brought common law fraud claims under New York law.206 Because
the victims of the fraud were geographically dispersed, the court held that
New York's law would apply as the state "where the fraud originated and
where substantial activities in furtherance of the fraud were committed." 20 '
In both UMP and Cromer common law claims, including aiding and
abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, survived motions to dismiss on
the merits. Certainly prior to Anwar it was less than entirely certain that
either of these causes could be privately maintained under New York law.
Anwar changed those odds in a plaintiff's favor.208
Comity-style considerations also exist at the state level, bearing on
whether common law causes of action will apply extra-territorially. The
principal considerations are: (a) is there any statutory prohibition of
extraterritorial application of the law; and (b) would application of one
state's law unduly intrude on other states? "[T]his doctrine [respecting
interpretation of laws] does not forbid the state from investing its courts
with jurisdiction over causes of action which accrue in foreign states
provided that such causes do not contravene the public policy of this
state." 209
202. UMP, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 192 ("[a] tort occurs in the place where the injury was inflicted"
generally, where the plaintiffs are located).
203. Id. at 193 (citing Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F.Supp. 2d 452, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
204, Id at 194 (where many of the critical events leading to the cause occurred abroad, it also may
be that foreign law will govern).
205. Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
206. Id. (locus of the fraud was "the place where the injury was inflicted, as opposed to the place
where the fraudulent act originated").
207. Id. N.b., that local law may permit jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that its laws would
measure the misconduct alleged.
208. See infra "State Law Causes and Presumptions."
209. N.Y. STAT. LAW §149, Comment (McKinney 2010). See Lucas v. Estate of Stavos, 609
N.E.2d 1114, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) ("Where ... rights and remedies are created by statute and not
by common law, the statute operates within the state where it was enacted but has no extraterritorial
force or effect upon actions arising in other jurisdictions." (emphasis added)). The Lucas court cites the
ancient but relevant reasoning of Buckles v. Ellers, 72 Ind. 220, 1880 WL 6323 (Ind. 1880):
[fn all purely personal actions of a transitory nature for torts at common law, a citizen of a
State may sue a citizen of another State, in the courts of such other State, or of any State
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Comity may also come into play under the guise of whether American
courts can extinguish claims of persons who purchased foreign listed
securities although those claims could not have been brought in the United
States. This anomalous prospect follows from the Matsushita decision,2 10
which held that class plaintiffs in state court proceedings could release
class member claims that could not have been brought in those courts.2 I
Federal courts are, however, obliged to give Full, Faith and Credit to state
court releases. Foreign courts are not equally obliged to do so.212 We turn
now to identification of securities related claims that may find greater
employment, if not given actual life, as a result of Morrison.
B. POSSIBLE PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION OTHER THAN § 10(B)
1. Section 18.
Section 18 of the Exchange Act permits private actions arising from
securities fraud wherever the purchased instruments were listed, but only to
the extent that the investor purchased "in reliance upon" defendants'
statements made in a filing pursuant to the Act or any rule or regulation
thereunder.213 Unlike § 10(b), § 18 does not appear to require a showing of
wherein he may reside, or may be found and served with process, without regard to the place
or State in which the injury may have been perpetrated. But that where certain acts are made
wrongs by statute, which were not such theretofore, or where remedies additional to those
which existed at common law are provided by statute, advantage can be taken of these new
and additional remedies only within the territory or locality in which the statute has force.
These constitute new rights, so to speak, and depend for their enforcement always upon the
statutes by which they are created. And such statutes will be enforced only by the courts of
the State wherein they are enacted.
Id. at 242 (citing DAVID RORER, AMERICAN INTER-STATE LAW 144-45 (1879)). See, e.g., Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976), superseded by statute as recognized in Gallea v. United
States, 779 F.2d 1403, 1405 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986) (suit against a Nevada bar that sold alcohol to an
intoxicated California driver who then caused an accident in California). The court ruled that a
California statute did not have extraterritorial application, but the bar was liable nevertheless for
common law negligence. 546 P.2d at 726-27; Blamey v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978),
abrogated by West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. Aug. 25, 1983) (Wisconsin
bar owner liable under Minnesota common law negligence, but not local statute).
210. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 380 (1996). A class
representative may release rights of class members who have some potential claims under U.S. law
arising out of the same transaction not covered by § 10(b). Presumably, though, foreign courts would
be intolerant of efforts by U.S. courts to extinguish rights of persons who had no contact with the
United States and no basis upon which to assert any claim under any United States law.
211. Id. at 380.
212. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 76,109 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). United States courts would
however recognize those judgments and accompanying releases in respect of Americans who had
purchased securities listed abroad.
213. See supra text accompanying note 1 19. It also may be that a § 10(b) class suitor would agree
to release claims of foreign investors that could be asserted under §18. This would create an as yet to
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scienter.24 Section 10(b) speaks of "manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance." Section 18 speaks only of "false or misleading" statements.
The requirement of "eyeball reliance" is, however, one that a class of
investors may be hard put to satisfy. For that reason, § 18 will prove most
useful for large individual investors who have purchased securities abroad
of an issuer whose shares also were listed domestically. There is some
possibility that Morrison would be used to delimit the extraterritorial reach
of § 18. There is language in that decision that speaks of the "Exchange
Act" rather than just § 10(b).2 15 But that risk should not be great. The
decision expressly addresses the issue of "whether §10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs",
etc.2 16 Moreover, the decision's purported close textual reading related to §
10(b), whose text is very importantly from that of § 18. Section 18
seemingly provides blanket license to those who had relied on SEC filings.
Most important, though, as a practical if not analytic matter, as classes are
not likely to use § 18, Justice Scalia would not see the need to limit the
law's geographic reach in order to assure that classes and their counsel
never arrive at Shangri-La. 2 17
2. Title 12 US.C. Section 632.
This little employed section confers federal jurisdiction where one of
the parties is a "corporation organized under the laws of the United States,"
and the action arises out of, inter alia, international banking or financial
operations. "Laws of the United States" means created by or pursuant to a
federal statute, rather than state laws. 218
3. Trustees
Going forward, some investors or fund beneficiaries may be able to
pursue fiduciaries who have abandoned the protection of § 10(b) by
purchases abroad of securities that could have been acquired on a domestic
be tested hurdle for a foreign investor who would employ § 18. The hurdle however could be easily
surmounted by "opting-out" of the settlement class that would impose such a release, but foreign
investors must be alert to the possibility of such a release.
214. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 800, 813 (S.D. Tex.
2007). However, section 18 also gives the court discretion to require an undertaking and shift attorneys
fees, events that would come to pass presumably only in the event of a "baseless and vexatious" claim.
Seegrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 534 F.Supp. 378, 385 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
215. E.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 ("we reject the notion that the Exchange Act reaches
conduct in this country affecting exchanges or transactions abroad. . .
216. Id at 2875 (emphasis added).
217. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886.
218. Creaccones Con Idea, S.A. de C.V. v. Mashreqbank PSL, 232 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2000).
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exchange.2 19 ERISA makes a plan administrator a fiduciary with respect to
the plan:
to the extent that (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises
any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its
assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such
plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.220
Plan administrators are held to the standard of care of a prudent person and:
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries and . . with the care, skill, prudence
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.221
Given these duties and standards, presumably a plan-beneficiary could
claim imprudence by a private plan or pension fund administrator/trustee
who elected to acquire securities beyond the zone of § 10(b) protection. In
In re Pfizer Inc. Erisa Litigation,22 2 plaintiffs alleged that defendants
breached their fiduciary duty by failing to manage the plan assets
prudently. Plaintiffs claimed imprudence in continuing to make and
maintain the questioned investments, which the court found sufficient to
state an ERISA claim. 2 23 The remedies available against a deficient trustee
are significant. ERISA § 409 makes a trustee who breaches a fiduciary
duty to an employee benefit plan "personally liable to make good to such
plan any losses to the plan resulting from such breach and to restore to such
plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of
assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate." 224 ERISA
§ 502(a)(2) empowers beneficiaries or participants to obtain appropriate
219. See Hecht v. Andover Associates Mgmt Corp., 27 Misc.3d 1202(A), 2010 WL 1254546, at *10
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) ("Plaintiff alleges that Andover Management breached its fiduciary duty by failing
to exercise diligence and prudence, not with respect to investment recommendations, but in the
management of Andover Associates' investments. Thus, plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim does
not arise from alleged securities fraud and is not. . . preempted by the Martin Act.").
220. ERISA is the acronym for Employee Retirement Income Security Act. ERISA claims in
federal court pre-empt state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty with regard to any private employee
benefit plan or pension fund. Fuller v. INA Life Ins. Co. of New York, 533 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1988) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41(1987); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)
(2010).
221. Fuller, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 216 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(1)).
222. No. 04 Civ. 10071, 2009 WL 749545 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2009).
223. 2009 WL 749545, at *8.
224. 29 U.S.C. § 1 109(a) (2010); see also U.S. v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council of Greater New
York, 909 F. Supp. 891, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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relief under ERISA § 409 and § 502(a)(3) empowers them to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief to redress violations of ERISA § 409.225 The
court in Harris v. Finch, Pruyn & Co.,226 held that "[s]ection 502(a)(2) is
not limited to equitable remedies," but allows for a "wider range of
remedies, including compensatory damages." 2 7  Compensatory damages
could be measured by successful results in lawsuits brought against the
same issuer on account of US listed stocks. What the entire range of
remedies might include also may be developed by reference to other
statutes occupying fiduciary territory.
New York State's Prudent Investor Act, 22 8 to name one example,
imposes the prudent investor standard on trustees who invest and manage
property.229 Where the initial investments are imprudent, damages are the
amount invested plus interest.230 The same would hold for an action
brought in state court, or on behalf of a public pension fund not preempted
by ERISA. 231
4. State Law Causes and Presumptions
An important, possibly essential, feature of actions grounded on §
10(b) is that the law generally allows the presumptions that material
information causes changes in market prices and that investors generally
rely on the integrity of those prices.232 As a consequence,
misrepresentations or omissions of adverse, material information
presumably inflate prices paid for securities, thereby inflicting injuries on
those who overpaid. The shorthand description of this set of presumptions
is "fraud on the market" theory, and that theory carries with it presumptions
225. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2), (a)(3), (B)(i).
226. No. 1:05-CV-951 (FJS/RFT), 2008 WL 4155638 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2008).
227. Id. at *2.
228. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §11-2.3 (2010).
229. Newhoff v. Rankow, Cohen, & Issac P.C., 435 N.Y.S.2d 632, 637 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1980).
230. Id.
231. Brooks v. Key Trust Co. Nat. Ass'n, 809 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (breach of
fiduciary duty claim); People ex rel. Cuomo v. Merkin, No. 450879/09, 2010 WL 936208, at *10 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2010) (defendant investment management had a fiduciary duty to act with care and
loyalty).
232. Basic Inc. v. Levison, 485 U.S. 224, 241-242, 246 (1988). Fogarazzao v. Lehman Bros., Inc.,
232 F.R.D. 176, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The fraud on the market presumption is simply a 'useful
device[ ] for allocating the burdens of proof between parties;' in the class certification context, it allows
plaintiffs to prove reliance by proving 'that the scheme as a whole artificially inflated prices."')
(quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 245); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 509, 555
(D.N.J. 2005) ("However, the requirement of showing direct reliance presents an unreasonable
evidentiary burden in a securities market where face-to-face transactions are rare and where lawsuits are
brought by classes of investors; therefore, the Third Circuit has adopted a rule, the fraud on the market
theory, that creates a presumption of reliance in certain cases.").
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of causality and reliance. Presumptions are procedural devices, not
substantive law.233 They appear in a great panoply of circumstances.234
We examine the laws of four states: New York, California, Illinois,
and Texas. Particular attention will be paid to whether local law creates the
kind of evidentiary presumptions that make possible class wide litigation
involving numerous transactions in impersonal markets. The most
important of these is a presumption of reliance, where reliance is required
at all. What then are private causes of actions and presumptions, if any, to
be found in our four-state sample?
a. New York
Ashland Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.,23 5 noted that several
courts have held that the Martin Act precludes private rights based on
common law claims other than fraud, 236 and have extended the Martin Act
233. See, e.g., In re Elter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
234. Compania Sude Americana De Vapores, S.A. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Balitmore, 940 F.Supp. 855,
863 (D. Md. 1996) ("[T]he doctrine [of res ipsa loquitor] is not a theory of liability, but an evidentiary
device that permits an inference of negligence to be drawn from a set of proven facts."); Constar, Inc. v.
Plumbers Local 447, 568 F.Supp 1440, 1444 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (regarding the Moore Dry Dock rules:
"Taken together they are nothing more or less than a device to be used in evaluating evidence,
developed to assist the trier of fact in determining whether or not specific union conduct (generally
picketing) is valid, primary activity or has a prohibited secondary object. . . the Moore Dry Dock rule is
only an evidentiary tool."); Panduit Corp. v. Band-It-Idex, Inc., No. 00 C 1461, 2000 WL 1121554, at
*16 (N.D. 11l. June 27, 2000) ("[tjhere is a strong presumption of validity for issued patents").
235. 700 F. Supp. 2d 453, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
236. Unless the claims are based on facts that provide the Attorney General with grounds to institute
an action under the Act. See Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 189-90 (2d Cir.
2001); see also Granite Partners LP v. Bear, Steams & Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 275, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Similarly, in Stephenson v. Citgo Group Ltd., 700 F. Supp. 2d 599, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (the court
found that Martin Act preemption does not extend to those common law claims that require elements
beyond what is necessary for Martin Act liability). The court states that:
New York courts have offered a persuasive justification for allowing common law fraud
claims to proceed while dismissing negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty
claims: "the latter two causes of action, like the Martin Act itself, do not require proof of
deceitful intent; common law fraud, however, does . . . courts concerned with preserving the
Attorney General's exclusive domain therefore preclude claims which essentially mimic the
Martin Act, but permit common law fraud claims, which require an additional element."
700 F. Supp. 2d at 613-614; see also Whitehall Tenants Corp. v. Estate of Olnick, 623 N.Y.S.2d 585,
585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) ("Without evidence of reliance or intent to defraud . plaintiff is
endeavoring to vindicate [rights committed] exclusively to the Attorney General."); Granite Partners
L.P., 17 F. Supp. 2d at 291 n.8 ("The Martin Act does not preclude private litigants from bringing
common law fraud claims because such claims require a plaintiff to prove intent or scienter. Therefore,
courts allow these claims to proceed while simultaneously dismissing negligent misrepresentation and
breach of fiduciary duty claims.")); Pro Bono Invs., Inc. v. Gerry, No. 03 Civ. 4347 (JGK), 2005 WL
2429787, at *16 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005) ("Unlike Counterclaims Eight through Thirteen and
Fifteen [alleging inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and gross negligence], the common
law fraud alleged in the Seventh Counterclaim is not 'covered' by the Martin Act because it requires an
266 Vol. 7:2
AFTERMATH OF MORRISON
and its pre-emptive reach to instances where a "substantial portion of the
events giving rise to the claim" occurred in the state, or even where venue
is appropriate in New York.237 The Martin Act limits itself to fraud cases
that take place "within or from New York,238 but, as Ashland reported,
considerable expansionist plasticity has been shown in deciding whether
the case arose "within or from" the state. It has sometimes sufficed that
"substantial portion of events" happened in the state, or even that venue is
proper in the state.239 As a result, unless a plaintiff can allege that the
claims arose without New York jurisdiction because transactional events
did not have a substantial portion take place within or from the state, that
suitor will be hard-pressed to escape the argument that the Martin Act
applies and pre-empts the cause.
Addressing the Martin Act's pre-emptive authority, the court in Anwar
recently held that "the Martin Act does not preclude [New York] state
common law causes that do not derive from or rely upon the Martin Act to
establish a required element of the claim."240 The decision distinguished
the power of the New York Attorney General solely to enforce the Act and
transactions covered by it from the right of individuals to bring claims
based upon common law that the Act did not create;241 that is, so long as
the cause was not created by the Act, but exists independent of the Act,
then even wrongs also covered by the Martin Act would not be pre-
empted.24 2 The decision in Anwar did note a division in New York
authority respecting the pre-emptive authority of the Martin Act, and that
the issue is coursing its way through the New York appellate process.24 3
Resolution of that issue will bear importantly on the power of individuals
and classes alike to pursue § 10(b) like claims in New York state or federal
courts. One supposes that New York will be venue for a considerable part
of non § 10(b) based litigation in the securities fraud arena.
It is not clear that a fraud on the market theory equivalent with its
presumptions would apply where New York common law serves on the
basis for a securities fraud claim; but it is almost certainly less likely to in
additional element of deceitful intent."); In re Bayou Hedge Fund Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 405, 421
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The vast majority of state and federal courts have found that causes of action related
to a plaintiffs securities fraud claim that do not include scienter as an essential element are typically
preempted by the Martin Act, in contrast to a claim requiring intent, such as a claim for common law
fraud.").
237. Ashland, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 473 (citation omitted).
238. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §352-c(l) (2010).
239. See Ashland, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
240. Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 354, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
241. Id. passim.
242. See supra note 175.
243. Anwar, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
Summer 2 011 267
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
instances involving misrepresentations rather than omissions.2" Regardless
of how the Martin Act decisions resolve, common law claims could be
available to plaintiffs who can allege that their cause arises under the laws
of another forum and where the parties' interactions were exclusively
without the state. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349-the state's Uniform
Deceptive Acts and Practices counterpart-has been held inapplicable to
securities fraud claims. 245
b. California
The antifraud provisions of California's state securities law permit a
plaintiff to sue for misrepresentations that affect the market without having
to prove actual reliance. 246 The "very purpose of these statutes is to 'afford
244. See supra text accompanying notes 171-173. In In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d
621, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), the Second Circuit observed that "federal courts repeatedly . . refuse[] to
apply the fraud on the market theory to state common law cases despite its wide acceptance in the
federal securities fraud context." However, the court recognized that there is an "open question" in the
Second Circuit as to whether the fraud on the market theory can be used to satisfy the reliance
requirement of a common law fraud claim under New York law. Id. According to Sumitomo Copper
Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2001), the New York Court of Appeals has
never addressed this issue and New York's lower courts have come to varying conclusions, with a
number holding that in New York proof of individual reliance is unnecessary in cases involving
fraudulent material omissions. See Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 683 N.Y.S.2d 179, 198 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998) (citing Brandon v. Chefetz, 106 A.D.2d 162, 167 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)). New York courts
have declined to extend this presumption of reliance to cases involving fraud based on affirmative
misrepresentations. See Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 60 A.D.2d 501, 509 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
Federal district courts applying New York law also have differed on this question. In In re Blech Sec.
Litig., 961 F.Supp. 569, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the court held that a fraud on the market theory was not
available in common law cases alleging misrepresentations or omissions but that it was available in the
context of market manipulation. Other cases have dismissed common law fraud claims for failure to
allege actual, direct reliance. See, e.g., In re Motel 6 Secs. Litig., Nos. 93 Civ. 2183 (JFK), 93 Civ.
2866 (JFK),1997 WL 154011, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997); Banque Arabe Et Internationale
D'lnvestissement v. Maryland National Bank, 850 F.Supp. 1199, 1216, 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Turtur
v. Rothschild Registry Int'l, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 8710 (RPP), 1993 WL 338205, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
27, 1993). More recent district court cases seem against application of presumption of reliance to
common law fraud claims. See, e.g., In re Marsh & Mclennan Cos., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 452, 493
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Feinberg v. Katz, No. 01 Civ. 2739, 2007 WL 4562930, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21,
2007). Whether or not reliance must be proven or presumed, common law fraud may sometimes be
pursued on a class-wide basis. See, e.g., Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F.
Supp. 2d 155, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss plaintiffs' common law fraud claim
within their class action complaint). Generally, though, one must expect resistance to class certification
if reliance must be proven. See, e.g., Vermeer Owners, Inc. v. Guterman, 169 A.D.2d 442, 445 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) (trial court's grant of class certification on common law fraud claim clear error
because in a "complex fraud action, [class certification is] unlikely to be granted due to the lack of
predominance of common issues of law or fact.").
245. See Cyber Media Group, Inc. v. Island Mortgage, 183 F. Supp. 2d 559, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
246. Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 580 (Cal. 1993). See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25400, 25500
(2010).
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the victims of securities fraud with a remedy without the formidable task of
proving common law fraud."' 2 47 These statutes impose:
no requirement . . . that the plaintiff rely upon the statements or acts of
the defendant or even that he be aware that the defendant made them or
engaged in them. All that is required is that the plaintiff establish that
the price paid or received was affected by the defendant's conduct or
statements. This per force presumes that someone acted on the basis of
the defendant's wrongful conduct without having to prove that he
personally was influenced by such conduct. 248
Morrison may have unwittingly revived securities claims based on
California's Unfair Competition Law ("Section 17200").249 Section 17200
had been a mechanism for launching state law based securities claims until
SLUSA foreclosed its use.250 Because Morrison held that § 10(b) no longer
applies to foreign listed securities, SLUSA should no longer bar the
employment of Section 17200 on account of purchases of foreign listed
securities.
The Section 17200 requires that a cause based on fraud or deception
show that "members of the public are likely to be deceived." 251' Reliance is
satisfied by showing that the misleading or omitted data was an "immediate
cause of the plaintiffs injury producing conduct,"2 52 with "a presumption,
or at least an inference of reliance" accompanies a showing of
materiality. 253 Materiality is determined objectively by the reasonable man
standard.254
Finally, in California a claim for constructive fraud, defined in the
California Civil Code has a relaxed reliance element.255 Constructive fraud
allows conduct insufficient to constitute actual fraud to be treated as such
where the parties stand in a fiduciary relationship, 256 and constructive fraud
247. Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 580. (quoting Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal.Rptr. 871, 877-78 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977)).
248. Id. at 580.
249. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2010).
250. See In re Charles Schwab Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 534 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Overstock.com,
Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 (Cal. App. Ct. 2007).
251. Aron v. U-Haul Co. of California, 49 Cal. Rptr.3d 555, 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
252. Hale v. Sharp Healthcare, 108 Cal. Rptr.3d 669, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
253. Weinstat v. Dentsply Int'l., Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr.3d 614, 622 (Cal Ct. App. 2010).
254. In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 39 (Cal. 2009).
255. CAL. CIV. CODE. §§ 1572, 1573 (2010). Constructive fraud requires (1) the existence of a duty
due to a relationship between the parties, (2) violation of the duty by making deceptive material
representations of past or existing facts or remaining silent when a duty to speak exists, (3) reliance
thereon by the complaining party, (4) injury to the complaining party as a proximate cause thereof, (4)
and the gaining of an advantage by the party to be charged at the expense of the complaining party. See
e.g.,Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Rana, 769 F.Supp. 1121, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
256. Estate of Gump, 2 CaI.Rptr.2d 269, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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"presumes the element of reliance absent substantial evidence to the
contrary."257
c. Illinois
Federal courts in Illinois have declined to extend the fraud-on-the-
market presumption to Illinois common law fraud claims.258 Plaintiffs must
prove actual reliance to prevail on a claim for common law fraud.259
Reasonable reliance is an element of a fraud claim under the Illinois
Securities Laws. 260
Illinois' Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 261
prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to
the use or employment of deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any
material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression
or omission of such material fact." Actual reliance is not an element of a
cause of action under this Act, and, hence, actual reliance need not be
shown. The Act is intended to protect consumers and business persons
against fraud, unfair methods of competition and other unfair business
practices.262 A plaintiff must show "(1) a deceptive act or practice by the
defendant, (2) the defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception,
(3) the occurrence of the deception during a course of conduct involving
trade or commerce, and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff (5) proximately
caused by the deception." 263
The Act provides "greater protection than the common law action for
fraud [because] a plaintiff suing under the Act need not establish actual
reliance." 264 However, the plaintiff must still show that he was deceived to
satisfy the statutory requirement of proximate cause.265 In Martin v.
Heinold Commodities, Inc., the court concluded that in securities
investment cases where plaintiffs allege that they have suffered financial
loss and file an action under the Consumer Fraud Act, loss causation must
257. Edmunds v. Valley Circle Estates, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
258. SeeIn re Soybean Futures Litig., 892 F. Supp. 1025, 1059-60 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
259. Barille v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 682 N.E.2d 118, 122-23 (lll. App. Ct. 1997).
260. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12 (2010). See Gandhi v. Sitara Capital Mgmt., LLC, 689 F.
Supp. 2d 1004, 1014 (N.D. 111. 2010).
261. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2 (2010).
262. Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 961 (111. 2002).
263. Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 776 N.E.2d 151, 160-61 (111. 2002).
264. Barille, 682 N.E.2d at 124. See also Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 734,
754 (111. 994); Siegel v. Levy Org. Dev. Co., 607 N.E.2d 194. 198 (lll. 1992); Adler v. William Blair
& Co., 648 N.E.2d 226, 233-34 (lll. App. Ct. 1995).
265. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160-61.
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be shown to recover damages:266 Loss causation means that "the investor
would not have suffered a loss if the facts were what he believed them to
be."267
d. Texas
Texas courts require a showing of actual reliance and do not recognize
a fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance for common law claims.268
Similarly, to succeed with a claim for statutory fraud under the Texas
Business and Commerce Code, "plaintiffs must show that they actually and
justifiably relied upon [defendant's] allegedly fraudulent
misrepresentations.26 9 However, under the Texas Securities Act
("TSA"), 270a plaintiff does not have to prove reliance; it is not an element
of a TSA claim.27 1 A purchaser must prove only that a security was sold by
means of (1) an untrue statement of material fact or (2) an omission to state
a material fact that is necessary in order to make the statements made in
light of the circumstances under which they are made not misleading.2 72
In short, Morrison certainly limits fraud claims for securities
purchased abroad, but does not shut all doors to United States courthouses
for those seeking relief for injuries related to purchases of those securities.
It even may open one or more doors that SLUSA had closed.
C. Congress and the SEC May, In Effect, Overturn the Decision
On July 21, 2010, Congress enacted the Investor Protection and
Securities Reform Act of 2010.273 The law explicitly authorizes the SEC to
institute extraterritorial claims, and district courts to have jurisdiction over
266. Martin, 643 N.E.2d at 747.
267. Id. (quoting LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Martin appears to have allowed both the misrepresentations and the injuries it proximately caused to be
established on a class-wide basis. It however gave plaintiffs little leeway in showing that the
misrepresentations alleged proximately caused the losses complained of. Id. at 747-48 (need to show
proximate cause but no need to show actual reliance).
268. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig., 490 F. Supp. 2d 784, 814 (S.D. Tex. 2007);
see also Griffin v. GK Intelligent Sys., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 684, 690 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Steiner v.
Southmark Corp., 734 F.Supp. 269, 270 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
269. In re Enron Corp., 490 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
270. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33, § A(2) (2001).
271. See Hendricks v. Thornton, 973 S.W.2d 348, 360 (Tex. App. 1998) (stating that reliance is not
an element of a claim under the TSA); Summers v. WellTech, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 228, 234 (Tex. App.
1996) (stating that the TSA does not require a plaintiff to show that he would not have purchased stock
had he know about the alleged adverse material facts).
272. Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 776 (Tex. App. 2001).
273. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§# 901-991, PL 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78111).
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them.274 The law instructed the SEC to study and solicit public comments
respecting extraterritorial private rights of action (§ 929Y). Those
comments must have been submitted by February 18, 2011.275 As the SEC
perpetually lacks the resources to pursue what private suitors may, it is
hoped that study occurs promptly and results in a recommendation that
those private rights be brought into being.
V. CONCLUSION
Economics on a scale that implicates capital raises and public stock
markets do not concern themselves merely with profits and losses. They
are matters of diplomatic importance. To acknowledge that transnational
economies drive international relations, we only need hear Chinese
grumbles at having to finance a United States economy whose currency is
being degraded by the enlargement by the trillions of the Federal Reserve's
balance sheet, and United States complaints about the allegedly
undervalued RMB.276
It is beyond genuine controversy, therefore, that money talks across
the developed and developing worlds, and no country takes kindly to
another's interference with their important businesses. The collection of
pre-Morrison authorities shows that courts in the United States have been
mindful of the etiquette associated with allowing foreign persons to use
domestic courts to secure money judgments against alien entities.
As the integration of the world's financial markets and their near
simultaneous access to common financial information are undeniable
imposition of similar consequences by similar means for fraudulent
conduct should be an aim of financially developed nations. In the United
274. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(b) amending Section 27
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78aa, provides:
(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION. - The district courts of the United States and
the United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding
brought or instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a violation of the
antifraud provisions of this title involving -
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the
violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only
foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect
within the United States.
275. See Comments on Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, SEC.GOv (Mar. 31,
2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4-6 17.shtml.
276. A nearly limitless list of items indicative of ongoing international financial tensions can be
found in Damian Paletta, France, Germany Set-Up G-20 Tiff on Bank Rules, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2,
2009, at Al0; G20 rift opens on banking reform, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, at 1. And then there are the
ongoing charges by the United States that China is devaluing its currency. See, e.g., Sarah O'Connor,
U.S. Hardens Stance on China's Currency Rigidity, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009, at 8.
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States, lawmakers and regulatory agencies should assure the availability of
§ 10(b), and also opt-out class actions, to any purchaser where the issuer's
securities trade on any domestic exchange, and the misconduct complained
of has some material connection with operations or other activities in the
United States. Countries should be presumed to give resjudicata effect to
judgments in these proceedings, unless a nation affirmatively declares
otherwise. Even then, United States courts should have the discretionary
power to let the matter proceed in recognition of the practical reality that
few, if any, class members, would respond to a final judgment in a
defendant's favor by initiating a fresh action abroad.
The desire for blanket exclusion of foreign investment plaintiffs from
United States courthouses enhances a wrongdoer's likelihood of escaping
full financial liability, and concomitantly weakens deterrence, thereby
increasing exposure of both United States and foreign investors to fraud.
Laws that insulate wrongdoers should be disfavored.
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